What Ukraine’s Kursk gamble has — and has not — achieved

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Turning the tables?

Last summer, a narrow circle of Ukrainian officials planned the Kursk offensive amid growing concern that the war was trending in the wrong direction. Ukrainian forces were struggling to halt Russian advances. The looming U.S. presidential election cast doubt on the future of vital American aid. Rumors swirled that Ukraine’s top military officer, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, was on the verge of being sacked. The Kursk operation, as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has put it, was a “bold step” intended to reverse Ukraine’s fortunes.

The offensive, launched on Aug. 6, caught Russia — and the rest of the world — off guard. Ukrainian forces quickly overran weakly defended Russian positions, taking the city of Sudzha and penetrating almost 30 kilometers into Russian territory. Ukraine captured hundreds of Russian troops, later traded for Ukrainian prisoners of war. Russia eventually found its footing, however. Reinforcements flowed to the region, and the Russian defense stiffened. Moscow’s forces have since retaken perhaps one-third of the occupied territory in attacks launched in mid-September and mid-October.

The Kursk operation buoyed morale, at least temporarily, among Ukrainian society and at least some Ukrainian troops. After nearly three years of war, Ukrainians were understandably gratified to see their country taking the fight to Russia. At the same time, troops fighting in eastern Ukraine have expressed resentment that the Kursk offensive diverted resources desperately needed elsewhere.

In the West, the offensive temporarily shifted the gloomy narrative surrounding Ukraine’s battlefield prospects. But the operation received a lukewarm response from the Biden administration and did not lead to a substantial increase in Western assistance. While Kyiv has sought to use the offensive to help persuade Washington to let Ukraine strike inside Russia with U.S.-provided missiles, the White House continues to rebuff these requests. President Joe Biden did announce that he would “surge” military aid for Ukraine in his remaining time in office, but the Kursk operation does not appear to have been the motivator.

Looking farther down the road, the occupied Russian territory could provide leverage for Ukraine in potential peace negotiations. Zelenskyy has indicated he aims to use it as a bargaining chip, calling the Kursk operation part of his “victory plan.” Whether Ukraine can hold its remaining territory in Kursk Oblast remains to be seen. For its part, Moscow has vowed not to bargain with Russian territory and says it will not negotiate until it has driven Ukrainian forces back across the border.

It is also worth noting that the Kursk offensive reportedly led Russian officials to pull out of negotiations on a potential moratorium on strikes on Russian and Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Preliminary talks reportedly have now resumed, however. Whether Moscow will negotiate in good faith is unclear, but such a deal would be a godsend for Ukraine. Since March, Russian missile and drone strikes have decimated Ukraine’s electricity production capacity, putting the country in a tough spot heading into winter.

Diverting whose forces?

A key goal for the Kursk offensive was to weaken Russia’s offensive operations in Ukraine. As Syrskyi said in August, Kyiv hoped the operation would “divert significant enemy forces,” particularly units attacking toward the cities of Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. On balance, the offensive failed in this respect. Rather than taking Ukraine’s bait, Russia adopted a more patient approach. Moscow has seemed content to retake the occupied territory gradually while attritting Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and concentrating on exploiting its opportunity in eastern Ukraine.

Since the offensive began, Russia has redeployed some 50,000 troops to Kursk Oblast, according to Syrskyi. These include various airborne and naval infantry units, which tend to be Russia’s most capable formations. But most of these forces came from lower-priority areas, such as the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv regions.

Russia apparently did transfer some units from the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions. These included forces from the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade that had recently redeployed to the Pokrovsk sector. Part of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade also seems to have gone to Kursk, while the rest has continued fighting in the Vuhledar area, southwest of Kurakhove. The Kursk operation may have also diverted newly recruited Russian troops who would have otherwise gone to eastern Ukraine.

Still, Russia largely preserved its groupings of forces in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions. In late August, Syrskyi said Moscow had actually reinforced its Pokrovsk grouping. Russia’s rate of advance in eastern Ukraine, while still relatively modest, has risen steadily since the Kursk offensive began. Most of these gains have occurred near Pokrovsk and, more recently, Kurakhove.

To the northeast, Russia has also reached the Oskil River near Kupyansk and is now attempting to close in on the city, which Ukraine recaptured in September 2022. Moscow’s reported deployment of North Korean troops to Kursk Oblast could speed up its advances there or allow Russia to concentrate more of its own forces in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the Kursk offensive has compounded Kyiv’s shortage of combat-ready forces. When the offensive began, Ukraine was already grappling with a deficit of manpower. This is the chief reason for Russia’s recent gains, as many Ukrainian units simply lack sufficient troops, particularly infantry. Although Ukraine’s mobilization rate spiked after a new law entered into force in mid-May, the pace has since fallen.

On Oct. 19, a Ukrainian General Staff officer admitted that the average number of Ukrainian troops simultaneously undergoing training has dropped to around 20,000 from almost 35,000 a few months ago, reflecting the decline in mobilization. Ukrainian commanders complain that the fresh troops they do receive often lack proper training and motivation and are consequently suffering casualties or deserting their units at an alarming rate.

Kyiv committed much of its limited reserves to the Kursk operation. It even pulled some units out of Donetsk Oblast, where Russia has concentrated its main effort. The 80th Air Assault Brigade, elements of which helped lead the incursion into Kursk Oblast, was in the middle of reconstituting following tough fighting in Donetsk Oblast. Its commander was replaced a week before the offensive commenced after he insisted his brigade was not ready. Ukraine has continued to send more units into Kursk Oblast in the months since the operation began. Most recently, elements of the 47th Mechanized Brigade, equipped with U.S.-provided Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks, have entered the fight.

Throughout the war, a shortage of reserves has repeatedly forced Ukraine to pull units from one area to put out fires in another. This occurred during the battles of Bakhmut and Avdiivka, Russia’s Kharkiv offensive in May, and more recently during fighting in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk areas. Now, however, the Kursk offensive has tied up forces — including some of Ukraine’s better units — that might otherwise be able to plug gaps in the front or to rotate out exhausted formations. Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops in the Donbas have said that since the Kursk offensive began, they have received less artillery ammunition and air support — both areas where Russia enjoys considerable advantages.

On the horns of dilemma

Ukraine is struggling to stabilize its lines. After capturing Vuhledar in early October, Russian forces breached Ukraine’s fortified defensive line behind the city in late October and are now pushing northward, apparently seeking to sever the main road to Kurakhove. Meanwhile, Russian forces are advancing toward Kurakhove from the east and north. Russia has also taken the city of Selydove, which could facilitate an eventual renewed push toward Pokrovsk.

Kyiv faces a dilemma. Attempting to hold the occupied territory in Kursk could eventually yield negotiating leverage, which Ukraine may soon need if the incoming Trump administration seeks to force Ukraine into peace talks. But this option would likely mean accepting further territorial losses in eastern Ukraine, including a heightened risk that Russia will achieve an operationally significant breakthrough. Alternatively, redeploying forces from Kursk to hotspots in the east would be embarrassing and would sacrifice a potential bargaining chip. But stabilizing its lines is itself important for Ukraine’s negotiating position.

If Russia proves unable to continue recruiting enough troops to sustain its current tempo of operations, this dilemma will likely grow less acute. There are signs Moscow is indeed having a harder time attracting volunteers. But whether Ukraine can hold out until Russia runs out of steam is unclear, particularly given the uncertainty surrounding U.S. assistance under President Trump.

In any scenario, an increase in Western aid would help immensely. The Biden administration needs to make good on its commitment to surge assistance for Ukraine. Congress should press the Pentagon to ensure it is being as generous as possible while still preserving U.S. military readiness. Now would also be a great time for Ukraine’s other friends — including South Korea, a significant producer of artillery ammunition — to step up their support.

For its part, the Trump administration would be wise to increase, not cut, assistance for Ukraine. Doing so offers the best chance of convincing Moscow to negotiate on acceptable terms.