POLITICS
When Georgia’s Central Election Commission announced that the ruling Georgian Dream party had won an overwhelming majority — more than 80 percent of the vote — in the Oct. 4 municipal elections, protesters responded by storming the presidential palace. The Prosecutor General’s Office in Tbilisi has charged five protest leaders with attempting a violent coup, while Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze accused the EU ambassador to Georgia of backing the opposition. Nearly two decades after its brief war with Russia, Georgia has become the most Moscow-friendly country in the South Caucasus — despite Russia still occupying 20 percent of Georgian territory and diplomatic relations remaining suspended. While Georgia is trying to find new allies, it is unlikely to break free from the Kremlin’s influence as long as Bidzina Ivanishvili’s party remains in power.
On Sept. 1, during a plenary session of parliament, Georgian Dream deputy Thea Tsulukiani reported on a six-month-long investigation into crimes allegedly committed by representatives of Georgia’s former authorities. The report states that in August 2008, “the Georgian army was drawn into a war” under the leadership of politicians who, “counting on support from external forces and ignoring the opinion of Georgian military officials, launched an offensive on the city of Tskhinvali.” Tsulukiani’s commission placed responsibility for starting the war on Georgia’s then-president, Mikheil Saakashvili. The country’s opposition countered that Russia would inevitably make use of the findings presented by this “traitorous commission.”
An upward spiral of loyalty
The work of Tsulukiani’s group is just one element in the long-running process of rapprochement between Moscow and Tbilisi. Davit Darchiashvili, a political analyst and professor at Tbilisi's Ilia State University, traces this process to as early as 2012, when Georgian Dream came to power: “The Russification of Georgian politics started long ago. Even though Ivanishvili’s coalition featured pro-Western figures, their hatred of Saakashvili blinded them so much that they paid no attention to it.”
For a long time, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili’s party refrained from open displays of loyalty to Russia. A notable incident occurred in 2019 at the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy, where Russian State Duma deputy Sergei Gavrilov took the seat reserved for the speaker of the Georgian parliament. The Georgian opposition reacted immediately by blocking the podium.
The ensuing protests were violently dispersed, yet officials, including the prime minister, condemned Gavrilov’s actions. The then-speaker of parliament — current prime minister Irakli Kobakhidze — resigned, a gesture by the ruling party meant to show that it “understands its responsibility before society.” Even Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili issued a statement about the “protocol mistake,” saying, “It is unacceptable for a representative of an occupying state to preside over any forum in the Georgian parliament.”
Two and a half years later, the situation had changed. On Feb. 1, 2022, amid growing concern that Russia was preparing to invade Ukraine, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution expressing support for Kyiv and calling for the prevention of military escalation. Russia, however, was not mentioned even once in the document. Responding to criticism, Kobakhidze, then chairman of Georgian Dream, said that the wording of the resolution “serves our national interests” and that the ruling party's foreign policy was aimed at ensuring “peace and security in Georgia.”
The controversial resolution was soon followed by a firm refusal to join sanctions against Russia. Georgia’s prime minister at the time, Irakli Garibashvili, said that imposing economic measures against Moscow “would only harm our country and our population.”
Turning its back on the EU
Despite its neutral relationship with Russia, Georgia’s rapprochement with Europe actually accelerated in 2022. In early March, Georgia applied for EU membership alongside Moldova. By the summer of 2022, the country was granted a “European perspective,” with a list of 12 candidacy conditions for Tbilisi to meet. Those that dealt with combating corruption, increasing electoral competitiveness, and de-oligarchization posed a challenge for the current government — and for Bidzina Ivanishvili personally.
Instead of trying to meet these requirements, the Georgian authorities chose to increase pressure on civil society. In the spring of 2023, Ivanishvili’s forces made their first attempt to pass a so-called “foreign agents” law, which the opposition immediately dubbed the “Russian law.” After several days of mass protests, the bill was withdrawn. Despite only modest progress in fulfilling the EU’s conditions, in December 2023 Georgia was granted EU candidate status “in advance.”
This was largely the achievement of Salome Zourabichvili, who in 2018 became president of Georgia with the support of Georgian Dream but went on to establish herself as an independent, pro-Western politician. For this “insolence,” Ivanishvili’s party effectively removed her from office at the end of 2024 and used a new electoral procedure — in which the president is chosen by an electoral college — to appoint former soccer star Mikheil Kavelashvili as head of state.
The celebratory marches in Tbilisi marking Georgia’s attainment of EU candidacy soon gave way to protest rallies. In the spring of 2024, fresh demonstrations erupted against the adoption of the “foreign agents” law — and this time, the street was unable to influence the outcome. In the fall of that year, yet more protests broke out over elections that much of the public believed had been rigged.
During the 2024 election campaign, Georgian Dream fully embraced anti-Western rhetoric, and the war in Ukraine became one of the central tools of its political messaging. According to the government’s narrative, Georgian Dream had “saved” Georgia from sharing Ukraine’s fate, while the opposition, allegedly under Western pressure, sought to drag the country into another conflict with Moscow.
Interestingly, in the past, statements about the country’s pro-EU opposition constituting a so-called “party of war” were made only in passing — or by politicians who deliberately distanced themselves from the ruling party in order to avoid drawing criticism toward Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream. But in 2024, Ivanishvili himself spoke about the alleged threat of a “second front” opening in Georgia and echoed the accusation that Saakashvili’s government had triggered the 2008 war.
On Nov. 28, 2024, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who had replaced Garibashvili earlier that year, announced that Georgia was unilaterally suspending its EU accession negotiations until 2028. The ensuing wave of protests faced an unusually harsh response — even by the standards of recent years — including police brutality, mass persecution of protesters, a series of repressive laws, and increased pressure on the opposition through the aforementioned Tsulukiani commission.
Protests against the falsification of the 2024 parliamentary elections were brutally suppressed
According to Darchiashvili, Georgia’s political U-turn after the start of the war in Ukraine was driven by two factors, one external and one domestic: “Suddenly, an entirely new reality emerged. Georgia could become a member of the European Union. First, of course, there were signals from the Kremlin that this must not be allowed to happen. And second, to join the EU, the Georgian government would have had to carry out reforms of its electoral system and judiciary, risking partial loss of power — something Ivanishvili and his allies did not want.”
Rapprochement lip service
Although Georgia has turned away from the West and towards Russia, Moscow’s affection remains purely rhetorical. “When it comes to matters of real significance for Georgia, Russia has taken no concrete steps,” Viktor Kipiani, director of the Geocase think tank, told The Insider. Russian politicians and officials — Vladimir Putin included — have repeatedly voiced approval of Tbilisi’s anti-Western initiatives. But according to Kipiani, “nothing has gone beyond statements and positive remarks.”
“If there was an area where Georgia’s expectations and Russia’s concrete actions should have aligned, it was the issue of restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity,” Kipiani said. “This topic was actively circulated during the election campaign. Georgian Dream created public expectations that Russia would offer some form of assistance on this matter. But every time Georgian officials made public statements, Russia immediately — without even a polite delay — denied them, insisting that the outcomes of the 2008 war remain in force and will not be revised.”
Instead of offering compromise in return for Georgia’s loyalty, the Kremlin has in recent years only strengthened its influence over the territories outside Tbilisi’s control. Georgian authorities, meanwhile, have chosen not to respond.
Feast in time of war
Following their so-called “policy of national interests,” the Georgian authorities never miss an opportunity to praise themselves for the country’s steady economic growth. In 2022, Georgia’s GDP grew by 10.1%, in 2023 by 7.8%, and in 2024 by 9.4%.
“It is highly likely that certain financial flows currently settling in Georgia are not solely the result of the country’s GDP,” Kipiani said cautiously, “but also stem from the routes used by certain circles outside Georgia — routes that pass through Georgian territory.”
According to a study by the Georgian branch of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), in 2022 Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia reached 19%, meaning that Russia had nearly caught up with the EU, which accounted for 21% of Georgia’s foreign economic activity that year. Researchers calculated that in 2022, Georgia was even more dependent on Russia than it had been at the end of Eduard Shevardnadze’s rule in 2003.
However, Georgia’s indirect profits from the war have gradually begun to decline. By 2023, Georgia’s dependence on Russia had shrunk to 16%, and to 12% in 2024, even if Russia remained the country’s largest individual economic partner, second overall only to the EU. This trend was driven by a decrease in the amount of Russian money making its way into the Georgian economy. In 2022, Russians (many of them fleeing the war) transferred more than $2 billion to Georgia; in 2023 — around $1.5 billion; but in 2024 — “only” $517 million. The influx of rubles during the first year of the war had even caused a record strengthening of the lari, Georgia’s national currency.
Revenue from Russian tourism also fluctuated noticeably over the three years. In 2022, it amounted to $890 million; in 2023, the figure was $1.16 billion; and in 2024, it fell again to $854 million.
In addition, Georgia benefited from the surge in transit traffic through its territory. In 2023, Russia’s Federal Customs Service described the Upper Lars crossing as a “breakthrough of the economic blockade imposed by European countries.” The number of transit trucks passing through Georgia increased by over 50% in 2022 compared to 2021 (from 322,000 to 496,000 vehicles). In the following years, growth plateaued, with the total coming in at around 514,000 in both 2023 and 2024.
In 2022, the number of ship calls at Georgian ports also increased by 20%, though in the following years it returned to pre-war levels.
Of course, not all of Georgia’s revenues from trade with Russia are easily traceable in official statistics. In the first half of 2023, for instance, 3,786 vehicles worth more than $53 million were exported from Georgia to Russia. However, after the EU introduced its 11th sanctions package in June 2023, the situation changed sharply. In August 2023, only 85 cars were re-exported to Russia (compared to 1,020 in July). This did not mean Georgia stopped re-exporting cars to Russia altogether — rather, as direct re-exports to Russia fell, shipments to Customs Union countries such as Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan surged.
It is known that Georgia may serve as a transit route for restricted dual-use goods headed to Russia, including drones, CPUs, GPS devices, and memory cards. However, the exact scale of this “share of exports” is difficult to determine. Kipiani emphasizes that, so far, “no Western agency has provided direct evidence or documentation” proving that Georgia has helped Russia evade sanctions, but “there is a prevailing perception that certain connections exist between Russian power structures and specific circles in Georgia.”
The border with Georgia remains one of the routes through which Russia continues to circumvent Western sanctions
Despite the seemingly lucrative economic cooperation, Georgia's benefits are transactional rather than stemming from Russia's support. One exception could be the restoration of direct air travel between the two countries in 2023, which proved mutually beneficial.
Overally, although Georgia’s dependence on Russia has declined in recent years, it remains significant. In some sectors, a potential deterioration in relations with Moscow could have a severe impact — for instance, in 2024, Russia accounted for 66% of Georgia’s wine exports.
PMs looking for friends
The economic benefits of Georgia’s loyalty to Russia are steadily diminishing. Yet the ruling party shows no intention of returning to the path of European integration. Instead, Tbilisi is looking for a “third way” — even if it leads through Beijing and Tehran.
In 2023, Georgia and China signed a strategic partnership agreement, though the asymmetry drew widespread criticism. Georgian Dream representatives even hinted that the controversial “foreign agents” law had been introduced not under pressure from Putin, but to please Xi Jinping. Georgian leaders regularly praise Chinese policy, and since 2024, the two countries have enjoyed a 30-day visa-free regime. Mandarin is even expected to be added to Georgia’s school curriculum.
Transparency International has documented the strengthening of economic ties between Georgia and China over the past 12 years, which started with Georgian Dream’s rise to power in 2012. By 2024, China had become Georgia’s fourth-largest trading partner, accounting for 8.2% of the country’s total trade turnover. Chinese contractors are involved in the implementation of many major Georgian infrastructure projects. Tbilisi does not seem to be deterred by the fact that some of these companies — including CCCC, which is building a deep-sea port in Anaklia — are under U.S. restrictions due to national security risks and ties to China’s armed forces.
In addition to trade and infrastructure projects that raise security concerns, Transparency International points to other troubling aspects of the cooperation: the purchase of Chinese surveillance systems, the possible contribution of Chinese companies to Georgia’s 5G network, cooperation between national banks and law enforcement agencies, and the personal business interests that Bidzina Ivanishvili and his inner circle have in China.
Prime Minister Garibashvili, Kobakhidze’s predecessor, also actively promoted the China course — right up until he stepped down in February 2024, leaving politics altogether.
“Irakli Garibashvili was essentially a political lobbyist for Chinese interests,” Vakhtang Maisaia, a doctor of military and political sciences, told The Insider. “After Garibashvili's resignation, Kobakhidze tried to take over this initiative but failed. As we can see, representatives of the Ivanishvili–Kobakhidze regime were not even invited to the Victory Parade in Beijing. Representatives from Azerbaijan and Armenia were invited — but Georgia was completely ignored.”
Under Garibashvili’s successor, Georgian relations with Iran have become increasingly friendly. “Kobakhidze was given the chance to ‘sit behind the wheel’ of projects related to Iran,” Maisaia says. In 2024, it was Prime Minister Kobakhidze who attended the funeral of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Later, despite criticism from the United States, he attended the inauguration of the new president, spoke of the friendly atmosphere in Iranian-Georgian relations, and emphasized Iran’s important role in the region.
Georgia is also seeking to deepen its economic ties with Tehran. According to Transparency International, over 12 years of Georgian Dream’s rule, “trade with Iran has tripled, the number of Iranian tourists has doubled, the number of companies registered by Iranian citizens has quadrupled, and direct investment has increased fivefold.” However, despite this progress, Iran’s share in Georgia’s foreign economic activity has remained at just 1% over the past three years.
At the same time, strengthening ties with Iran may be viewed negatively not only by the U.S. but also by Israel. Maisaia believes this may have been the reason behind the recent visit to Georgia by Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir: “This is a very dangerous game, because it carries the risk of confrontation with Israel. Why didn’t the defense minister or the foreign minister come to Georgia? It’s no coincidence that it was the national security minister who came and held closed-door talks with the so-called Prime Minister Kobakhidze.”
From an economic standpoint, Turkey appears to be Georgia’s most promising partner. In 2024, Turkey matched Russia in terms of total economic engagement, and ties with Ankara are being cultivated by new President Kavelashvili, who visited Turkey this past August. “Bidzina Ivanishvili has very limited room to maneuver. For instance, the so-called president Kavelashvili was sent to Turkey for negotiations. But Erdoğan set tough conditions and brought up the issue of the Meskhetian Turks. As I understand it, those were very tense talks,” Maisaia commented.
Professor and political analyst Darchiashvili, in turn, believes that while Georgia may indeed be trying to build ties with other authoritarian regimes, this does not necessarily mean distancing itself from Russia: “It’s unlikely that this could happen without Russia’s participation, influence, and, ultimately, permission. In such a game, Georgia hardly has any alternative other than remaining dependent on the Russian government.”
Georgian Dream’s last hope for escaping this dependence rests with the Trump administration, which in recent months has shown increased interest in the South Caucasus region, drawn mainly by the opportunity to participate in peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the Georgian authorities have so far been unsuccessful in capturing Trump’s attention.
On Sept. 1, president Kavelashvili published an open letter to his American counterpart. Even though the document is in Georgian, the president speaks to the White House leader with unmistakable Russian inflections: “It is important that, in the perception of the Georgian people, the United States be associated not with the deep state, but with a strong American president; not with constant attempts to disturb peace and cause destabilization, but with peace and stability; not with gender and LGBT propaganda, but with respect for traditional values.”
According to Maisaia, Georgian Dream should not expect a response from Washington: “Kavelashvili is asking Trump, ‘At least wave a hand in our direction!’ He claims they share ideological values. But what common values could Trump possibly have with a pro-Russian regime at this stage?”
Geocase think tank head Kipiani largely concurs: “There is talk from the Georgian authorities about normalizing relations with the West, but these are mostly empty declarations, incapable of significantly influencing developments in Georgia. The EU is approaching the limit of its ability to affect the situation in Georgia. The last such boundary could be the suspension of the visa-free regime.” Kipiani notes that, without the active engagement of the Georgian public, any change in the country’s foreign policy course is unlikely.
Finally, as Darchiashvili explains, Tbilisi's ties to Moscow, involving “shadowy, semi-criminal networks and security service channels,” are unlikely to be broken anytime soon. He is confident that Georgia will remain within Russia’s sphere of influence for as long as Georgian Dream remains in power.