Donald Trump’s much anticipated White House meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky proved to be a diplomatic failure. However, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s talks with the U.S. president, the united pro-Ukraine stance of European leaders, and the initial statements from Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, indicate that Europe will not abandon its partner in Kyiv. Even if American aid is completely cut off, Ukraine still has a chance to hold out, as European military support has accounted for more than half of the assistance the country has received since being invaded by Russia just over three years ago. But for European support to be truly effective, European leaders must move beyond strong rhetoric and take more decisive practical steps.
Statements from Donald Trump and his team leave little hope for continued U.S. military aid to Ukraine. However, despite the American president’s direct confrontation with Volodymyr Zelensky, there has been no outright rejection either. So far, the new administration has not announced any new military aid packages, yet deliveries under previously approved agreements continue.
Meanwhile, leaks from U.S. intelligence suggest that Vladimir Putin has no interest in peace, as he still believes he can bring all of Ukraine under his control. Furthermore, Trump and Zelensky failed to reach an agreement on a framework deal concerning Ukraine’s mineral resources, which was set to be signed on Feb. 28 but was instead argued over as the cameras continued to roll right in the Oval Office.
Trump told Zelensky to come back only if he was ready for a deal
Western media increasingly report that without American aid, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will last only six months before suffering a complete collapse and the disintegration of the front. It is true that the U.S. has played a truly critical role only in certain areas of military-technical cooperation between Western allies and Ukraine, meaning one of the key factors determining the future stability of Ukraine’s forces will come down to Trump’s willingness to sell specific categories of weapons and ammunition and Europe’s readiness to finance these purchases while doubling its own military aid from current levels. To address this, a major emergency summit was held in London this past Sunday.
Who helps Ukraine more?
Donald Trump cites figures ranging from $300 billion to $500 billion spent on aid to Ukraine. In reality, the total allocated funds amount to $183 billion, of which only $83 billion has actually been spent. The rest remains unused, undisbursed (i.e., still reserved), or “expired” — $2.7 billion was not used in time and is no longer available. According to official U.S. data, commitments approved but not yet funded amount to $57 billion, while available but unspent funds stand at $40 billion.
Of the total military aid, $45.8 billion falls under the PDA (Presidential Drawdown Authority) program and $33.2 billion under USAI (Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative). However, only $65.9 billion of this has been included in announced aid packages, and the actual deliveries of military equipment, ammunition, and weapons to Ukraine amount to just over $50 billion.
According to calculations by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (Kiel Institut für Weltwirtschaft, IfW Kiel) — the most authoritative source on foreign aid to Ukraine over the past three years — the total announced support from Europe (EU member states, EU institutions, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and the UK) and the United States amounts to a total of €246 billion. Of this, €120 billion has come in the form of direct military aid, while the rest consists of financial and humanitarian assistance. The EU has allocated €70 billion in financial and humanitarian aid and €62 billion in military aid, while the U.S. has provided €50 billion in financial and humanitarian aid and €64 billion in military assistance.
As for actual, rather than announced, European military aid deliveries to Ukraine, in November 2024, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell estimated that the EU had sent €45 billion worth of weapons and military equipment. In other words, in terms of delivered military aid, the Europeans are on par with the Americans.
Finally, Volodymyr Zelensky himself stated that the total cost of the war for Ukraine amounts to $320 billion, of which $120 billion was financed from Ukraine’s own resources, while $200 billion was provided in roughly equal shares by the U.S. and the collection of European allies. According to Zelensky, U.S. assistance includes $67 billion in arms supplies and $31.5 billion in direct budgetary support.
What resources can Europe offer?
If Trump completely withdraws U.S. support for Ukraine, maintaining the current level of funding would require the remaining allies to contribute €80 billion in total aid and €40 billion in military assistance annually for as long as the fighting continues. This burden would not fall solely on Europe but also on non-European countries such as Canada, Australia, Japan, and other members of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.
The largest European economies, such as Germany and the UK, have so far allocated — though not necessarily spent — a meager amount on Ukraine: around 0.2% of their GDP per year, similar to the relative level of U.S. support. For Italy, France, and Spain, the figure is even lower — 0.1% of GDP per year. While Europe’s combined GDP is ten times larger than Russia’s, Russian military spending exceeds Ukraine’s by about €40 billion.
Providing Ukraine with €80 billion in annual funding would require expenditures equal to 0.4% of Europe’s GDP — without even counting Ukraine’s own contributions or those of non-European allies. For comparison, Russia’s defense and security spending for 2025 exceeds 8% of its GDP. Even with known national budget constraints, Europe has the option of using a debt-financing mechanism similar to the one created during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the EU issued €800 billion in Eurobonds to mitigate the economic impact of the lockdowns. Moreover, Europe currently holds approximately $280 billion in frozen Russian assets.
The problem, however, is that Europe's defense industry does not produce the full range or quantity of military equipment Ukraine needs. According to researcher Fabian Hoffmann, European companies can replace supplies of artillery shells and armored vehicles, but without U.S. participation they cannot meet Ukraine’s needs for long-range missiles. Deliveries of the Franco-British Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles are measured in dozens. Germany has only 600 TAURUS missiles, and as of the start of the war in Ukraine, only 300 were considered combat-ready. Neither of these missile types appears to be in production.
Beyond that, without American support and supplies, it would be extremely difficult to maintain the combat readiness of Ukraine’s multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), air defense systems, and artillery, as well as to plan and conduct airstrikes on targets in the Russian rear.
Can Europe support Ukraine without the U.S.?
Even if U.S. military aid were to be completely cut off, Trump might still agree to sell weapons to European countries — both for their own rearmament and in order to facilitate further deliveries to Ukraine. In that case, the issue would come down to funding.
However, if the U.S. were to restrict the supply of weapons, military equipment, and ammunition even to Ukraine’s European allies — a move that would certainly hurt the bottom line of America’s defense industry — then Europe would have almost no room for maneuver in the short term.
In his aforementioned column for The Insider, Fabian Hoffmann noted that the key obstacle to ramping up military production in Europe is not a lack of manufacturing capacity or financing, but of political will. For example, increasing the production of Leopard 2 tanks from 50 units to several hundred per year would require about €10 billion in concrete orders. The same applies to other capital-intensive projects in the defense sector.
It is worth noting that even before Donald Trump’s return, the Biden administration pursued such a cautious approach to military aid that Ukraine’s direct dependence on the U.S. remains limited to only a few critical areas. Moreover, Ukrainian forces have already experienced prolonged periods with little to no American support: in the first months of the invasion in 2022 and again from October 2023 to April 2024, when new aid packages stalled in Congress. In both cases, there was no collapse of the front and no breakdown of the Ukrainian army.
At the same time, the European Union, Canada, and the UK — now forming a relatively united front in their support for Ukraine despite the persistence of holdouts like Hungary and Slovakia — were not operating at the limits of their capabilities during those periods. Now, however, Germany’s incoming chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has publicly backed France’s proposal to strengthen the EU’s joint military budget and coordinate defense procurement and orders.
The fear of losing Ukraine altogether appears to have become a genuine wake-up call for European leaders. However, as Vladimir Putin has repeatedly said, “there is no time to waste.” What matters now is not just Europe’s willingness to say the right things, but its capacity to act — whether by providing Ukraine with real security guarantees or, if necessary, deploying troops to enforce a future peace agreement, should one ever be reached.