Exactly two years ago, with the Russian Armed Forces facing catastrophic manpower shortages on the front in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin announced a “partial mobilization.” The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) had just executed a lightning counteroffensive that liberated large swathes of the Kharkiv region, and Kyiv’s troops were already preparing to do the same around Kherson. Although Russia managed to stabilize the situation in 2023, rumors of a new wave of mobilization have never ceased to circulate, and the recent Ukrainian incursion into Russia's Kursk Region has given them new momentum. Russia’s acute personnel shortage is evidenced by the facts that Russian commanders are forcing wounded soldiers back to the front, that its army is still making use of poorly trained conscripts, and that after nearly two months, Russia still has not been able to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Kursk Region. Military experts believe Russia could mobilize another 300,000 troops, but that it would struggle to equip and arm them. Meanwhile, mobilization would come at a huge political cost, as those Russians who might have been willing to take up arms have largely already enlisted, and drafting men who are reluctant to fight presents a series of added difficulties.
On the battlefield in Ukraine, August and early September were marked by Russia's offensive in the Pokrovsk sector of the Donetsk Region. While the advance was fairly rapid by the standards of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Russian “war correspondents” have been complaining almost constantly about shortages of personnel and the resulting exhaustion within the advancing group. More and more wounded soldiers in recovery are being forced back to the front, and UAV operators and servicemen from other military branches are being transferred to serve in the infantry (1, 2).
As a result, pro-war Russians are wondering whether a new wave of mobilization is in order, especially since Ukraine has reinvigorated efforts to expand its ranks with the adoption of a draft dodgers law. If Wall Street Journal sources are to be believed, Russian commanders were already emphasizing the need for mobilization to Putin more than six months ago.
To the displeasure of the “patriotic” crowd, Russian officials at various levels of government continue to assure the public that no new wave of mobilization is planned (1, 2, 3), and they frequently report on the supposed successes of contract military recruitment — which is stimulated by frequent pay raises for those willing to enlist voluntarily. The Russian leadership most likely expects to meet at least its short-term military objectives — such as the complete capture of the Donetsk Region — without calling a nationwide mobilization.
The Kremlin's calculations do not seem to have been affected by the Ukrainian breakthrough into Russia's Kursk Region: according to estimates from Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, the Russian command managed to pull roughly 35,500 troops to this sector in a few weeks by transferring reserves from quieter parts of the front. As a result, Russian forces even launched a counter-offensive and regained control over several villages.
Personnel
Its current rate of personnel replacement allows the Russian Armed Forces to compensate for its losses, according to the international research group Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT). “There was a difficult period in the first half of 2024, when the trickle of recruits was too slow to make up for losses and create new units. However, the issue appears to have been resolved by raising bonus payments. We saw an increase [in the number of recruits] in the second quarter, and in the third quarter, there was another pay raise, probably resulting in another increase. Whether it will help in the long term remains to be seen. The issue may need to be revisited closer to the end of the year. Until then, the situation is unlikely to become threatening. The only scenario that would necessitate mobilization is the encirclement or destruction of a large group of troops. But the situation on the ground makes such a development almost impossible,” the experts conclude.
Military analyst Yan Matveev adds that if mobilization did take place, it would not help the Russian Armed Forces achieve its tasks in the short term:
“I don't think that even a second wave of mobilization can guarantee Russia’s capture of Donetsk Region. Putting together a large infantry force is not enough. And it won’t be that large in any case — maybe another 300,000 troops, which is fewer than last year's number of contract recruits, if we are to believe the available reports. They may be able to recapture Kursk Region. But the Russian forces could manage it even without mobilization if they allocate more troops and resources.”
The fate of the soldiers mobilized in the previous wave remains unclear. Their wives are set to resume protests demanding their husbands’ return home. Probably the best-known Russian mobilized serviceman, the author of the Vault No. 8 Telegram channel, complains about the lack of rotation and keeps count of his fellow soldiers who have sustained wounds and suffered illnesses over two years of active frontline duty. Matveev is sure that such a long stay at the front has a detrimental effect on the mobilized. “Admittedly, soldiers are gaining experience, but the overall impact is negative, of course. Fatigue builds up, both physical and psychological. They become prone to negative effects like fatalism. Nothing good comes out of this.”
CIT believes this problem has not yet become critical for the Russian army:
“The mobilized have become somewhat less involved in assault actions, giving way to mostly fresh volunteer contract servicemen. Therefore, the troops’ fatigue has a smaller impact. In addition, strict, or should we rather say brutal, discipline — all those pits, basements, and so on — so far allows commanders to maintain order among the troops. Known cases of desertion by entire units can literally be counted on one's fingers, and this is one of the hallmarks of a tired army.”
If the Russian leadership decides to declare mobilization, it risks encountering the same difficulties that plagued the “first wave” two years ago — from outdated clerical data to a lack of resources for housing, equipping, and training recruits.
In September 2022, huge queues of Russians running from mobilization formed at the Verkhny Lars crossing on the Russian-Georgian border
The authorities failed to process a great number of recruits, and military enlistment offices found they were years behind on their data. In many cases, recruits turned out to be sick or unfit for service, a fact that received broad media coverage. According to CIT:
“To resolve the second issue, the authorities decided to create electronic registers of persons liable for military service and introduce digital summonses. In theory, this would ensure the second wave is conducted more smoothly. In any case, we are still yet to see the new system in action during the regular fall draft, as the registers are set to go live on Nov. 1. The system will likely function in at least some of the regions, most notably Moscow, but whether it will be operational nationwide is a big question. The efficiency of the envisaged barriers, such as foreign travel and driving bans, also remains to be seen, as they would require interagency cooperation, which has never been Russia’s forte.”
In the event of a new mobilization wave, these measures would likely be needed in order to overcome even stronger domestic resistance than Russia faced the last time around, argues Grigory Sverdlin, the head of Get Lost, a Tbilisi-based anti-war charity that helps Russian soldiers desert and escape abroad:
“Each legislative initiative, be it a digital summons register or bigger fines for failure to appear at the military enlistment office or provide information about employees liable for military service, causes an increase in the number of requests we are getting from those who are affected by this initiative and are looking for ways to avoid the draft.
“So I have no doubt that people will try to avoid mobilization by any means possible simply because so many are tired of war and don't believe it will end soon.
“Whether they will become better at evading military service is a question I can't answer. There is no telling how the unified registers of summonses and persons liable for military service will function after their launch in the fall.”
According to Sverdlin, if the authorities synchronize the databases of tax bailiffs, traffic police, border guards, and military enlistment offices, draft dodging will become more difficult, as summons recipients will not be able to travel abroad, drive a car, take out loans from banks, or perform real estate transactions. Only time will tell whether the synchronization will be successful.
“The main obstacle for the new wave of mobilization is the lack of candidates,” analyst Matveev says. “The authorities are grabbing everyone willing to go to the war for money. Meanwhile, forcing people to take up arms for free will be a much greater challenge. This is where law enforcement agencies may turn out to be short of the capabilities to make sure everything goes quickly and smoothly. We may see raids, conflicts, and protests across the country.”
In 2022, a wave of protests against mobilization swept through many Russian cities
According to CIT, gradual recruitment of contractors appears preferable for Russia considering the lack of resources to “process” a large number of mobilized soldiers at once:
“For the time being, the problem has been resolved through paid recruitment. It also decreases pressure on the authorities because recruits sign up voluntarily — and even if they are fathers of four or more, no questions are raised. Contract-based service supplies 20,000-30,000 fresh troops a month, which the system can easily digest.”
Matveev agrees that it will be difficult to provide the mobilized with everything they need. “As for stocks of uniforms and other necessities, I don't think the situation has changed in any way. During the second wave, the mobilized might just get paid a lump sum upon enlistment to buy everything themselves,” he suggests.
Military equipment
Another challenge Russia will inevitably face with the anticipated new mobilization is a shortage of arms and military equipment. With the help of satellite images, OSINT analysts regularly document the depletion of Russia’s stocks of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery. In addition, the effort to de-mothball all existing stocks is limited by the country’s repair plant capacity and the condition of the remaining vehicles and is hardly sufficient to make up for equipment losses at the front. Under these conditions, the capabilities of newly mobilized units would lag far behind those of the first wave, not to mention of Russia’s “pre-war” brigades and divisions.
“During the mobilization, the authorities used up a considerable share of vehicle stocks to equip the new units, and over the next two years, the stocks were further depleted. If a second wave were announced now, the new units would have to be rifle units — or motorized, at best,” CIT experts say. Rifle units, consisting of largely foot-mobile infantry with towed artillery support and lacking armored vehicles, were the backbone of the Red Army during the Second World War. They disappeared from the Soviet order of battle during the Cold War, but have recently made a comeback on both sides of the front as Russia and Ukraine grapple with shortages of combat vehicles. A new wave of mobilization would dramatically increase the number of these outdated units poorly adapted for modern warfare.
“The Russian army is already shifting to the tactic of infantry assaults, where soldiers attack in small groups without vehicles. Due to [Russia’s] numerical advantage, the tactic is working. Its active use will probably continue,” Matveev suggests.
Despite the obstacles, experts nevertheless agree that Russia could mobilize another 300,000 people if necessary. “If mobilization becomes necessary, in terms of political stability, another 300,000 is unlikely to seriously undermine the regime,” CIT experts believe.
“In the past two years, the screws have been tightened. The government cracked down on protests of mobilized soldiers’ families, and even the relatives of conscripts who found themselves amidst heavy fighting in Kursk Region did not make any trouble,” the analysts explain. At the same time, according to Matveev, “further recruitment will not be painless. Either every single soldier will have to be paid or repression will be inevitable.”
Economy
The economic aspect of mobilization cannot be overlooked either. With unemployment in Russia hitting one record low after another and regional authorities banning the employment of migrants in entire sectors, a one-time extraction of hundreds of thousands of economically active men from the workforce could have serious consequences — especially once the tens of thousands of men who will flee the country once mobilization is announced are factored in.
“Let's say they can mobilize 200,000-300,000 men. If they are skilled workers, it would deal a heavy blow to the key industries, slowing down their growth and causing a decline in GDP,” argues economist Vladimir Milov. “If they grab whoever they can get, do they have anyone left after those two and a half years? Meat-grinder assaults and the previous mobilization considerably depleted the number of unskilled workers.”
This is another reason why authorities prefer to recruit contract servicemen, as the value of the average “volunteer” for the economy is lower, CIT believes:
“Companies are hiring 'people off the street' to use them to meet their [military recruitment] targets while preserving their staff. As harsh as it may sound, an unemployed man with a bank loan and the last combine harvester operator in a village have different ‘value’ for businesses and, therefore, for the economy. Since mobilization is a lottery, the probability of losing a skilled professional is much higher. Additionally, replacing 30,000 employees a month is not quite the same as 300,000.”
In the end, if the Russian government were to announce a new wave of mobilization, it risks running into mass evasion and shortages of arms, gear, and military vehicles, and in the process, the callups could also deal a significant blow to the economy. This might be why Vladimir Putin, who will ultimately make the decision on mobilization, continues to increase the incentives for contract servicemen to enlist voluntarily.
However, the gradually exacerbating personnel shortages in the Russian army may sooner or later result in defeat at the front. At the moment, there are no visible signs that such a scenario is imminent, but two years ago few could have predicted the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the Kharkiv Region, the breakthrough that prompted the first wave of mobilization in Russia. The last time around, delaying mobilization only exacerbated the systemic problems associated with bringing men under arms against their will, and today the Russian leadership risks repeating its mistakes.