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“Hit him harder, make him drool blood”: Businessman Leonid Nevzlin’s alleged vendetta against the associates of Alexei Navalny

The Insider has obtained screenshots of messages, previously partially published by Russia’s state-owned propaganda outlet RT and Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF). They confirm that Russian-Israeli businessman Leonid Nevzlin, an outspoken exiled Kremlin opponent and a former associate of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, ordered attacks on senior ACF figures Leonid Volkov and Ivan Zhdanov, as well as Alexandra Petrachkova, the wife of Russian opposition economist and Navalny associate Maxim Mironov. After a thorough analysis, The Insider concludes with the highest confidence that the correspondence in question is authentic.

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The origins of Nevzlin's correspondence

The correspondence in question was obtained by Andrei Matus, a fraudster from Krasnodar affiliated with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). In Russia, Matus had been tried for willful injury and apartment fraud, and judging by the way he was recorded in his contacts’ phone books, he was believed to be working for the FSB. The FSB-affiliated VChK-OGPU Telegram channel elaborates, calling Matus a “fixer” working under the FSB's Sixth Service (the one in charge of economic crimes) and claiming he has helped to solve problems for entrepreneur David Yakobashvili, among others. Matus is also known to have been a source for the Dossier Center, Mikhail Khodorkovsky's investigative project.

Andrei Matus

Matus's affiliation with the Sixth Service is confirmed by the fact that he provided the Dossier Center with a fake FSB leak suggesting that GRU agent Jan Marsalek was hiding under the pseudonym Max Mayer — a “leak” replete with photos and videos of “Mayer-Marsalek.” As The Insider subsequently established, the man in those photos and videos was not Marsalek, and the spy himself was hiding in Moscow under a completely different name. Incidentally, according to The Insider's sources, it is the FSB's Sixth Service that supervises Marsalek in Russia (more on that below).

Matus told the ACF that the head of the Dossier Center, Kristijonas “Kris” Kucinskas, introduced him to associates of Leonid Nevzlin — a Russian-Israeli entrepreneur and a business partner of Khodorkovsky’s — and Kris confirms that these Nevzlin associates had previously reached out to Matus for assistance in matters connected with the private affairs of Nevzlin's relatives in Russia. Matus also said Nevzlin himself had approached him in 2024 with an unusual request: to help get rid of evidence, namely the mobile phones of a crew headed by Anatoly Blinov, whom Nevzlin had allegedly hired to do a job. According to Matus, Blinov took care of all Nevzlin’s unsavory affairs in the Baltics — business that included Nevzlin hiring Blinov to beat up Navalny's aide Leonid Volkov in exchange for 250,000 euros. Matus said that Nevzlin, after learning that the assault had only resulted in minor injuries, refused to pay.

After receiving Blinov’s mobile phone (Matus did not specify the details of the transaction), Matus did not destroy it but instead, fearing for his own fate once the evidence was destroyed, contacted Nevzlin's business competitors and, finally, the ACF, offering information in exchange for 200,000 euros and protection for his family. During the negotiations, he sent the ACF fragments of what he said was correspondence between Nevzlin, Blinov, and himself. The ACF team not only studied the screenshots but also met with Matus in Montenegro to listen to an audio recording of Nevzlin's conversation with him, in which Matus and Nevzlin discussed a plan to destroy evidence and any traces of his criminal activities (the sound of Nevzlin's voice in the audio appears authentic — which in itself does not prove anything, of course).

When the ACF refused to pay for the information, Matus ostensibly shared the correspondence with the FSB, and it was soon made public by the Russia Today television channel. After that, Matus contacted the ACF again, no longer hiding his affiliation with the FSB, and shared videos from the chats on the three phones he was supposed to destroy. Having analyzed the screenshots, the ACF invited Christo Grozev of The Insider and Mikhail Maglov of Proekt to join the investigation and independently verify the authenticity of the correspondence.

Kris has partially verified Matus’ account and stated that Dossier used him as a source — up until the moment they discovered that his information was riddled with contradictions and that Matus himself traveled to Russia freely. According to Kris, he and Matus have not been in touch since mid-2023, and it was not until this past June that Dossier received an anonymous message asking whether they wanted to know who ordered the attack on Volkov. The sender told them about the events in Argentina and Vilnius and showed several screenshots of Nevzlin's messages but failed to provide any specifics. To that, Kris answered: “If it's another sham, I don't want to be a part of it. If it's true, you should go to the police.” (Matus describes Kris's reaction in similar terms, without specifying who the mystery sender was.)

Kris asserts that he called Khodorkovsky immediately, and that the latter agreed they needed to report the findings to the police. According to Kris, Nevzlin said he would do it himself.

What follows from the leaked messages

The key participant of the correspondence is Anatoly Blinov, who was formerly Boris Berezovsky's lawyer. In 2006, Blinov was sentenced in Russia to six years in prison for attempted fraud; upon his release, he moved to Europe.

The correspondence also suggests that Blinov travels with a fake Latvian passport.

Blinov uses the Signal app to exchange messages with several recipients: Nevzlin himself (who uses two Signal accounts — the public one and one nicknamed “Arye Bar Am,” which is known only to a small group of trusted individuals and matches his unofficial Twitter handle, which was discovered by The Insider), Nevzlin's aide Roman Zhelyazko (username “Roger Jolly”), and Matus. The Insider's team studied several thousand messages exchanged in 2023 and 2024.

The attack on Maxim Mironov’s wife

Maxim Mironov is an economist with ties to Navalny’s team. He has moved to Argentina and often criticizes Nevzlin on Twitter, calling him a “crook and thief.”

“[Leonid] Nevzlin is one of the main beneficiaries of this war. Until February 2022, Russia could hire tough lawyers and Nevzlin lost every trial. After the war, the strong lawyers refused to work with Russia and Nevzlin immediately rushed to get the $70 billion faster so it wouldn't go to Ukraine,” read Mironov's tweet from June 5, 2023.
“In the 1990s, when [Russia] was on the brink of starvation, Nevzlin and Co. were plundering state property while bathing in luxury. The same thing is happening now — Ukraine will need a lot of money for reconstruction. All seized Russian assets must go to Ukraine. But Nevzlin wants to take that money for himself,” reads a second tweet from Mironov on that same day.
“[Mikhail] Khodorkovsky spent 10 years in jail. In many ways he has redeemed himself. I’m sure he has understood a lot. As for Nevzlin, he was a crook and a thief, and he still is. Now he’s busting his ass to get his paw on 70 billion dollars of seized Russian assets. So that Ukraine does not get them. Surely, he needs it much more [than Kyiv],” read another of the economist's tweets dated June 13, 2023.

On Sep. 1, 2023, Mironov's wife Alexandra Petrachkova was walking along the street with their 10-month-old child in a stroller. An unknown individual assaulted her, hit her across the face, and shouted, “Stay away from Russia!”

The Insider identified the attacker as Polish national Grzegorz Daszkowski and reported him to Polish law enforcement agencies, which arrested him in April 2024.

The leaked correspondence contains a video of the attack on Petrachkova that was not published previously. (The video is not included in this piece for ethical reasons.)

Judging by the correspondence, not only did Nevzlin order the attack, but he also meticulously followed its execution and the subsequent media coverage:

The first screenshot reads: “The Poles say thank you ['thank you' emoji] and promise a nicer format in the Baltics.”
Nevzlin replies: “Harder, and harder again. But more humiliating.” To which his counterpart says: “I gave the instruction to [make him] kneel down and apologize while drooling blood.”
The second screenshot reads: “While delivering the message to M [likely Maxim Mironov] got one in the face, but due to the lack of video confirmation of this fact, there will be a continuation and consolidation of the warning, as he did not heed the first time.”
Nevzlin replies: “Harder, and with consequences. I hope the first time doesn't ruin the second.” “It’ll be done :)” the other person replies.
The third screenshot reads: “Got a ticket to Argentina for Thursday, for the new tourist.”
“He’s just asking for it. I don't even feel sorry for them.”
“Because they’re all going unpunished.”
“Well, on the one hand, the world keeps turning regardless of what they say, but on the other hand, these scoundrels were never disciplined — even in hard times.”
“Worse still — others look at them and think they can do [something similar].”
“Russia now, and Russians in general, have lost the understanding of reputation and responsibility for one’s words.”

The attacks on Volkov and Zhdanov

In June 2023, during protests in support of Alexei Navalny, ACF director Ivan Zhdanov was attacked — and once again, a first-person video of his attackers talking to each other in Polish surfaced in the correspondence involving Nevzlin.

With Volkov, the plan was more elaborate: not only “beat him up so that he never walks again,” but also abduct him and bring him to Russia “in a small boat.” According to Matus, the plan was being coordinated with the FSB in Saint Petersburg, where the Russian security agency was supposed to “receive the parcel.”

On Oct. 17, 2023, Nevzlin’s contact writes: “There’s a corridor for the package, but it needs to be confirmed within 1-2 days, as the package is being returned to the sender [Russia] not entirely voluntarily. If confirmed, we’ll return everything to the Motherland.”
Which Nevzlin dismisses: “Hi. We’ll talk later.”
The following day, Oct. 18, sees a follow-up: “Good day, we’re starting to track the package.”
“When?” Nevzlin replies. “Tracking — monitoring the route, to be honest, we’re ready to start even this weekend, just let me know when.”
To which Nevzlin replies: “Time to do away with the moron.”
Those messages are followed with several photos of Maria Pevchikh and Leonid Volkov’s homes, an image of “Pevchikh’s car,” and another image of a residential area, with the contact saying “The homes of V and P are on the other side, both are on the upper floors.”

Criminals followed Volkov and Maria Pevchikh for a long time, sharing surveillance photos in the chat — and sometimes deceiving their client. They sent photos of a house unrelated to ACF leaders, and also of “Pevchikh outside her car” when in fact the photo was of a random girl next to a type of car Pevchikh had never owned. The hitmen eventually abandoned the abduction plot and decided to focus on the assault.

As The Insider discovered, Polish investigators managed to trace their supervisor — a Russian national matching the description of Anatoly Blinov. However, he fled the country before the authorities had had the chance to bring him in for questioning.

Other targets

According to the correspondence, Nevzlin harassed Navalny’s other associates. In particular, he received reports about criminal proceedings initiated against Vladimir Ashurkov in Latvia (such a criminal case was indeed filed, and Ashurkov has been questioned as a witness). Seeing Ashurkov in Israel made Nevzlin happy: he was presented with an opportunity to get rid of an enemy.

The list of Nevzlin's targets includes businessmen Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven, whose companies he hoped to place under sanctions worldwide, and media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky, whom he sought to have stripped of his Spanish passport.

Nevzlin's motives

Despite making claims about his “lack of interest in Russian politics,” Nevzlin never concealed his loathing of the Anti-Corruption Foundation. The majority of his tweets deal with this particular topic, and using his private Twitter account, he harshly criticized Navalny’s supporters for having the wrong attitude and threatened to “respond symmetrically”:

Political scientist Fedor Krasheninnikov: “Maybe it’s all about personalities [in this case]?”
To which Nevzlin replies: “Fedor, please stop reducing substantive discussion to conclusions like: ‘you’re an idiot.’ First, you targeted Khodorkovsky, then [Dmitry and Gennady] Gudkov. In this way, you’re doing the work of the [Russian] authorities. Now, here’s a suggestion: stop doing this, and we can consider the matter closed. If not, expect a 'symmetrical response' on this topic.”

Many of the public figures interviewed by The Insider reported receiving threats from Nevzlin or his representatives — usually in response to criticism of Khodorkovsky or Nevzlin personally. However, none of The Insider's interviewees took these threats seriously.

Before staging the attacks, Nevzlin was in a state of undeclared war with the ACF. The Nevzlin-funded Sota Telegram channel (not to be confused with the independent publication SotaVision) constantly denounced Navalny's team, and Elena Krushevskaya, a Sota correspondent and Nevzlin friend also known as Bella Fox, authored a false story positioning the Free Russia Foundation's “elf factory” project as “Navalny's bot farm.” (In conversation with the ACF team, Nevzlin denied his complicity in the act of misinformation, but his employees are known to have approached several media outlets with proposals to publish this story before Mikhail Svetov's SVTV publication finally agreed.)

Off the record, Leonid Nevzlin explained his hatred for Navalny's team by the fact that they, especially Maria Pevchikh, purportedly worked for none other than Roman Abramovich, Nevzlin’s long-standing nemesis.

Nevzlin's FSB connections

As mentioned earlier, Nevzlin's initial plan proposed abducting Volkov and taking him to Russia via a special corridor at the border — a scheme that Nevzlin would have had trouble setting up without the FSB’s assistance. In theory, such a corridor, like any smuggling loophole, could be arranged through ordinary corrupt border guards. However, the correspondence contains ample evidence of Nevzlin’s close contact with the FSB's Sixth Service. On one occasion, he provides information citing “the chief of Sechin's Spetsnaz” (a common moniker for the Sixth Service); on another, he gives the service's address.

“The head of the FSB operational group, who commanded [Russia’s former Minister of Economic Development Alexei] Ulyukaev's arrest, says he doesn't know such a person. They were accompanied by the cops, but he doesn't know them. The head of [Igor] Sechin's team doesn't even know this. If he’s from the police, then it needs to be checked with their department. I'll clarify,” Nevzlin writes.
“Shebanov Evgeny. He’s never been a cop,” his contact replies, adding: “I just spoke with him, he’s still serving, and he’s open to any offers, if needed.”
“Okay. I'll think it through soon,” says Nevzlin.

Here it is worth recalling that Matus was a fixer for the FSB’s Sixth Service specifically, and he had helped solve problems for entrepreneur David Yakobashvili, who testified in court that he was a personal acquaintance of Sixth Service officer Stanislav Petlinsky. As The Insider previously reported, Petlinsky was Marsalek's handler, and most likely, he was the one behind the attempt to plant misinformation about Marsalek with the Dossier Center.

The Insider also discovered that the Sixth Service has experience attempting overseas abductions. Nevertheless, it remains unclear from the correspondence whether the attack had been coordinated with the FSB from the start, or whether the would-be kidnappers hoped that Volkov would simply be arrested “upon receipt” without prior coordination. As Matus told the ACF, the “shipment” plan was being coordinated between Nevzlin’s crew and the FSB in Saint Petersburg (but they never finalized the details). Meanwhile, many of the messages from “Nevzlin” in the leaked correspondence indicate that he would have preferred to have Volkov brought to Russia, and in some of the chats, he even speculates as to whether the politician’s forced border crossing might be complicated if his injuries from the planned assault were to leave him wheelchair-bound.

Why this correspondence is unlikely to be fake

The fact that this correspondence was provided by individuals involved in the attacks is beyond doubt, as it contains videos of the assaults on Petrachkova and Zhdanov that were not publicly available.

But does it really involve Nevzlin, or did the FSB merely exploit the feud between Nevzlin and the ACF to “throw” disinformation about his purported involvement into the public domain?

A careful analysis of the correspondence indicates that at least the majority of the messages are authentic, and that Nevzlin was indeed behind these attacks. Here's why:

  • The correspondence includes a quote from a Signal conversation between Nevzlin and Pevchikh, which could only be obtained by someone with physical access to the devices of either Nevzlin or Pevchikh. Even if someone hacked their accounts, they wouldn’t have access to messages without also getting physical access to the device.
A fragment of Maria Pevchikh's correspondence in Nevzlin's Signal account
“The ACF came after me and backed down. Now all the words are recorded. But they don’t want to apologize,” Nevzlin writes on Signal, followed by multiple screenshots of Maria Pevchikh’s private messages to him.
  • As correctly noted by Vlad Romantsov, all tweet links shared by Nevzlin in the correspondence contain a specific parameter (t=taRExlwtL5tmHK4OIFQ30g), which is a coded user identifier that is transmitted when sharing tweets. Searching this code reveals a tweet dated Sep. 11 (matching the date on the screenshot). While it is technically possible for the FSB to account for this detail in a forgery, the level of sophistication required to do so is very high, suggesting that the tweet is authentic.

  • Nevzlin's messages not only match his style and the content on his official and unofficial Twitter accounts, but also exhibit characteristic writing habits. Navalny’s team pointed out several such habits in their own analysis, such as the word “tweet” («твит» in Russian) spelled with two “t”s (“твитт”), double smiley faces, and timestamps written with colons — all forming a distinctive writing style (which could be faked, but such a fake would require additional effort and attention to detail).
Side-by-side comparison of Nevzlin's correspondence with a source and with Pevchikh
  • The correspondence contains thousands of messages from four accounts, which not only need to align with each other in terms of meaning and chronology but also with real world events. Many of these events — such as the flight data of Nevzlin’s colleagues, friends, or relatives, along with details of his business conflicts — were not publicly known. Putting together such a detailed correspondence would require an enormous amount of effort. Additionally, there are many fragmented phrases that would make no sense to an outsider without context. In ten years of studying hacked correspondences, The Insider has never encountered a convincingly forged correspondence of such scale and complexity.

  • Sometimes, attackers insert certain phrases into a real hacked correspondence in order to compromise their target. However, obtaining correspondence from multiple devices at once is quite difficult (and recall that Signal messages can only be accessed with physical access to the device). Additionally, the overall correspondence in question comprehensively reflects the nature of discussions between the client and the attackers, and altering a few individual messages would not change the core of the conversation.

  • If the correspondence were fake, it would inevitably contain some errors that Nevzlin could easily debunk to prove his innocence (after all, the correspondence contains a wealth of factual details, including messages about flights, meetings, and photographed documents). However, Nevzlin issued only a general statement of his non-involvement and did not attempt to disprove the published screenshots. If the correspondence were authentic but included inserted fabrications, Nevzlin could have made the original materials public in order to prove this.

Finally, much of the specific detail mentioned in the correspondence regarding the attacks (including money transfers from Nevzlin to Blinov) is easily verifiable by law enforcement, who, according to information available to The Insider, are already investigating the matter.

Leonid Nevzlin declined to comment to The Insider for this story.