OPINION
The Kremlin is eager to spotlight the BRICS summit in Kazan, which began on Oct. 22, as evidence that Russia is not diplomatically isolated from the rest of the world. Putin aide Yuri Ushakov noted that around 30 countries have applied for membership in the bloc, which Russia hopes to position as an alternative to the G7 and G20. However, some of Moscow’s closest partners, such as Kazakhstan and Serbia, are distancing themselves from talk of joining BRICS. To make matters worse, a number of expected guests also didn’t show up in Kazan — Brazil’s President, Lula da Silva, canceled at the last minute, citing a head injury. Political and economic divisions are weakening the organization, and the influx of membership applications shouldn't be mistaken as a sign of strength, says Anton Barbashin, political analyst and editorial director of the analytical platform Riddle Russia. While BRICS serves as a form of self-therapy for Russia, helping it maintain the illusion of global importance, other member states are happy to go along while taking advantage of Moscow’s economic generosity — including discounted energy supplies.
Had it not been for the Western media, BRICS might never have been born. The acronym first appeared in an analysis by the investment bank Goldman Sachs as shorthand for the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (South Africa, represented by the “S,” joined in the bloc’s first expansion in 2010). Initially, the term was meant to denote a group of non-Western, developing economies. It could have faded just as easily as it emerged, but instead, the four — and later five — countries embraced the media narrative and sought to formalize the grouping.
The original concept of BRICS as a club for emerging economies appealed to all its members, especially Russia. It fit Russia’s fantasy of a multipolar world where rising economic powers would gain political influence and eventually compete with the West. But has this vision been realized?
Even today, with Russia holding the BRICS presidency, Russian commentators struggle to articulate the bloc's purpose and logic. They repeatedly invoke the mantra of reforming global governance and financial institutions. While Moscow’s BRICS partners echo these ideas in public, many members — both old and new — are uninterested in Russia’s version of multipolarity — let alone in addressing Russia's own internal problems.
BRICS (or, more accurately, BRICS+) has never been as vague and lacking in clear goals as it is on the eve of the Kazan summit. The members diverge on key issues, have different relationships with the West, lack a unified stance on Russia, and hold conflicting interests — particularly sharp between China and India in Asia, and Iran, UAE, and Egypt in the Middle East. South Africa, once a key player, has lost influence due to internal political turmoil and declining GDP, leaving it to follow China’s lead in foreign policy rather than balancing Beijing's influence.
Seen through a purely functional lens, BRICS offers Russia little in the way of tangible benefit. Many BRICS countries support Western sanctions to varying degrees. The BRICS bank, established in 2014 for infrastructure investment and once touted by Russian officials as an alternative to the IMF, refuses to fund new projects in Russia due to sanctions risks.
Russia has pushed for BRICS members to invest in creating independent payment systems, but so far, only Iran has shown real interest. Meanwhile, tensions between members like India and China or Iran and the UAE make consensus on most issues all but impossible.
India and China are a perfect example of the group’s internal contradictions. They are frequently on the brink of armed conflict due to their unresolved border dispute in the Himalayas. Their last skirmish in 2020 resulted in the deaths of at least 20 Indian soldiers, while China’s casualties remain unknown. In recent years, India has deepened ties with U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region, aligning with the anti-China coalition.
Similarly, Iran has strained relations with most Gulf states. While Tehran is not in direct conflict with the UAE at present, the UAE — a recent BRICS addition — continues to back Saudi Arabia, which Iran threatened with war earlier this month.
BRICS has attracted numerous membership applications, often from countries aiming to expand into new markets or elevate their standing in the eyes of the West. Despite Russia’s enthusiastic talk about 30 applications aiming to join the club, Moscow itself has called for a pause in expansion in order to reconsider BRICS' identity and direction.
The question isn't whether BRICS is inherently unviable, but rather what can be expected from it. The format itself isn’t contradictory if viewed as a club of countries that, while not united by shared ideals, are simply looking to gain something from one another. Whether or not that something is more substantive than the BRICS Games remains in question.
According to the organizers, about 5,000 athletes from nearly 100 countries participated in the BRICS Games, which took place in June 2024 in Kazan, Russia.
Photo: TASS
For example, China, currently the most influential member, uses BRICS as another platform to assert or promote its leadership among countries of the Global South. China is the only member whose trade with all BRICS countries is growing, making Beijing the strongest advocate for expanding the group. Countries drawn to China are expected to become reliable allies in backing future initiatives that require majority support.
India participates in BRICS for similar reasons. So far, China and India are the only members competing to shape the agenda, which could eventually become a shared platform for the remaining members. At present, however, nothing that happens in BRICS imposes any binding commitments. This explains the large number of membership applications, as countries see it as an opportunity to attend a high-profile event, network with key figures, and secure benefits — all without taking on any formal obligations.
Several such applications have been influenced by lobbying efforts from China and India, each seeking to include allied or client states. Some, like Turkey’s, appear to be strategic moves aimed at pressuring Western partners and are unlikely to gain serious consideration. Others, including Russia’s close ally Kazakhstan, have openly declined having any interest in joining.
Why does Russia need BRICS?
For Russia, any high-profile event involving major global players is a victory in itself. A summit of non-Western heavyweights in Kazan is far more impressive than Putin’s meeting with Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang. The more Russia participates in international events, especially as a host, the easier it is to find new partners willing to buy Russian goods or assist in circumventing sanctions.
BRICS includes Russia’s key partners outside the former Soviet Union. China is Russia’s most crucial trade partner, ensuring the country retains access to essential goods like cars, computers, and microchips for its military-industrial complex. India is a vital customer of Russian oil and remains an important buyer of Russian arms. Brazil and South Africa have called for peace in Ukraine on terms favorable to Moscow. Iran, after North Korea, is a crucial arms supplier for Russia's war in Ukraine and plays a key role in establishing alternative financial institutions, particularly through mutual recognition of payment systems and banking exchanges.
But all of this pales in comparison to BRICS' most important function: offering a platform that allows members to consistently promote their own vision of the direction of the international community. For Russian leaders, BRICS serves as a mold for shaping a multipolar world — one in which Mosocw not only preserves, but potentially enhances, its global influence. This explains why Russia is more proactive than others in proposing new working formats within BRICS, even though these initiatives have so far been confined to areas like sports and minor scientific collaborations.
After all, Russia is the only country from the Global North participating in BRICS, enabling its foreign policy experts to echo slogans that seem to resonate strongly with Vladimir Putin — particularly about the importance and uniqueness of Russia as a so-called “civilization state.”
In this sense, BRICS is a form of self-therapy for Russia amid Mosocw’s ongoing war in Ukraine. Its place in the group reinforces the idea that the country is still winning and that its desired multipolar world will emerge. Other BRICS members and observers have little incentive to challenge this narrative, especially while they benefit from discounts on Russian oil (like India) or watch Russia's economy grow more dependent on them (like China).
Friendship with Russia, especially during wartime, translates into discounts on exports and higher payments for support and assistance. As long as the Kremlin has the resources to hand out concessions to its international partners, non-Western countries will continue engaging Moscow in any format that suits their interests. But of course, the imposition of secondary sanctions by countries outside the BRICS bloc could temper that interest.