A nation adrift: A year into al-Sharaa’s rule, Syria remains undecided on its political system and foreign policy

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Who is Ahmed al-Sharaa? A heartless cynic or a shrewd, pragmatic realist? Syrians have been asking this question more and more often after their new leader’s Kremlin handshakes. In October, Sharaa paid an official visit to Moscow, and this past Monday Vladimir Putin sent the Syrian leader a congratulatory telegram. How can one shake a hand stained with so much Syrian blood, many in the country wonder.

A chameleon ruler

Many analysts hail Sharaa as one of the most gifted politicians of our time. Few could have first exploited ISIS and then al-Qaeda to their advantage, subsequently set them against one another, and later distanced themselves from both while building an independent and durable regime in the northwestern province of Idlib. Relying on a technocratic rather than a sectarian-Islamist government, the emergent leader organized life in the province so effectively that governance alone served as a solid election campaign. Reports of improvements in daily life in Idlib became the subject of envy for the entire country, even reaching Damascus. News also spread of the Idlib ruler’s contacts with Ismailis and Christians, seemingly confirming that his promises of religious tolerance were not mere lip service. Sharaa then launched a meticulously planned military campaign to the south, swiftly seizing Aleppo. From there, he took one city after another, reaching the capital on the 11th day, where he was greeted by jubilant crowds.

Last year’s developments suggest that Sharaa may well be a pragmatist — or even a cynic — but he is certainly no jihadist. Jihadists do not wear suits and ties, do not publicly shake hands with American generals or presidents (let alone the head of the World Jewish Congress), and do not hug an old Alawite friend. Moreover, they certainly do not permit alcohol sales, allow women to walk the streets without head coverings, or dispatch guards to protect Christian churches from attacks.

Skeptics in the West, Russia, and Israel do not believe in Sharaa’s supposed transformation, interpreting it as a mere change of costume. After all, Sharaa first wore medieval Islamic garb and went by Abu Muhammad al-Julani as the presumed head of an al-Qaeda affiliate, then he began appearing in public in khaki fatigues, and finally, after proclaiming himself president of all Syria, he donned a European suit and tie.

But those who know him well are not surprised by this transformation. The Economist calls him “a chameleon” and “the great pretender,” while Islamist scholars say he has no ideology and is driven solely by considerations of power. None of these assessments is complimentary.

All of Sharaa’s qualities have a troubling flip side. A person obsessed with power — especially one who has obtained a virtually unconstrained version of it — can be dangerous to society, presenting a risk of the regime evolving into an absolute, horrendous dictatorship. For Liberation Day festivities, Sharaa once again donned a khaki uniform and addressed his people at the parade, promising to build a “Syria for all Syrians.” In his speech, he claimed the country had broken with its past, one full of repression and violence. “The Assad regime sowed discord and doubt, erecting walls that divided Syrians,” Sharaa said, clearly alluding to the previous government's deliberate policy of encouraging confessional divides in society. The Assads had elevated the Alawite minority, to which they themselves belonged, to an artificially privileged position and relied on other minorities, such as Christians, to preserve their rule.

Under the previous regime, “even words became a crime,” Sharaa said. “We declare a complete break with this legacy, an end to that era, and the beginning of a new chapter — a chapter of nation-building,” he added. Not a caliphate, not an emirate, but a nation — words that sound anathema to any true jihadist.

Yet it is clear that Sharaa's personalist dictatorship is already taking shape. Unless the president is assassinated — he has already survived several attempts — a dictatorship is imminent.

Dictatorship is taking shape

This past fall’s elections to the provisional Syrian parliament are hardly a display of democracy: one-third of its members were appointed by the president, while two-thirds were chosen through a questionable form of indirect voting, which clearly offered an advantage to supporters of the new regime.

But try telling the gigantic crowds — who celebrated liberation in Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, and other cities — that their new government is illegitimate and ought to be overthrown. You are unlikely to find much sympathy. The alternatives are either a turn to deeply earnest Islamist fanatics or a return of the Assads and the Alawite Shabiha militia. In fact, Sharaa’s level of support is all the more notable in the new Syria, where words are no longer a crime and criticism of the government and of the president personally can be heard on every corner.

Surely, there is indeed plenty of reason for criticism. For starters, Sharaa’s government does not control the entire country. The Kurds in the northeast maintain near-complete autonomy. Their army, the Syrian Democratic Forces, is well-armed and highly capable. Clashes between government troops and the Kurds occur periodically, despite the integration agreement signed in March. Notably, this year's Liberation Day was not officially celebrated in Kurdish areas. Individual attempts to organize impromptu street celebrations could even lead to arrests by law enforcement.

In the south, relations with the Druze are a particularly fraught issue. Part of the Druze community favors integration, but the separatist majority strives for secession, hoping for support from Israel. Some even display Israeli flags, not Syrian ones, on city streets. On Monday, there was no trace of any Liberation Day celebration in the area. The leading Druze separatist figure, Hikmat Salman al-Hijri, appears no less power-hungry than Sharaa and is seeking to become the ruler of an independent state.

Al-Hijri has imposed a harsh police regime in the areas under his control and is reportedly persecuting those resisting his authority and ideology. The walls of homes are covered with vicious graffiti mocking Sunni Muslims.

Tensions are also high in the areas of the Mediterranean coast inhabited by the Alawites, as the local population fears a repeat of the reprisals it suffered in March. The attacks against them involved units that formed part of the government forces, including divisions absorbed into the new official army from the now-dissolved Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group with a membership that features openly Islamist jihadist fighters from Chechnya and Uzbekistan.

The violence last spring led many to question how much control Sharaa really has over his former allies (even if it must be acknowledged that the security forces under his command have generally been able to prevent new acts of violence in recent months).

The country’s economy — like many of its cities — lies in ruins. Most Syrians still live in hunger, dwelling in partially destroyed buildings. Those who fled Assad’s terror are gradually returning, but they often find unemployment and poverty awaiting them at home. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Syrians remain abroad in miserable refugee conditions. Meanwhile, hardline Islamists are plotting revenge against Sharaa for his “betrayal.” From the comfortable perspective of a Western politician, there is little to envy in the Syrian president’s position.

Nevertheless, the dictatorship is taking shape. The key question is how harsh, repressive, and brutal it will be. There is some chance that it may go down in history as relatively mild (at least when compared with the terrorist, fascist rule of the Assads, which nearly destroyed the country). If the optimistic forecast for the new government proves true, the unfortunate, half-ruined country may stand a chance of rising from the ashes.

So far, Sharaa’s track record in this regard is not the worst: during his time as head of the mini‑state in Idlib, he faced political opposition — mostly from more radical Islamists who were dissatisfied with his moderate course. Demonstrations were held under hardline slogans, and participants openly called to overthrow and even kill the Emir (as Sharaa, then going by Julani, styled himself).

When appeals to disperse peacefully failed, the Emir’s forces broke up the protests fairly decisively, but without particular cruelty. Still, hundreds of the most active opposition members were arrested, and some received relatively long sentences. In short, they became political prisoners, but none were executed, nor were there reports of torture. Compared with how Assad’s government treated its opponents, these repressions seem extremely mild.

The main argument in Sharaa's favor is that there is nothing even close to a preferable alternative. Syria has no genuinely liberal-democratic force that is capable of taking and holding power, and all other groups in possession of those two essential qualities are far worse than the current regime.

Radical members of the Israeli government have proposed organizing an assassination attempt on Sharaa. Hopefully, they realize that this would bring about the collapse of the state and, most likely, plunge Syria into a new round of civil war. But who would emerge victorious from such a war? Most likely, the far more radical, genuine jihadist fanatics — a neighbor that would hardly serve Israel’s interests.

In the event of Sharaa’s demise, another possible (though far less likely) scenario would involve an attempt to restore the rule of the Assad clan using a combination of the Alawite Shabiha militia, disgruntled former officers, pro‑Iranian formations based on Hezbollah, and the Russian security services. Persistent rumors claim that the latter are discussing just such a possibility with Assad and his entourage in Moscow.

Still, such a turn of events seems all but impossible. On the other hand, if Sharaa were to be killed, the resulting vacuum would be too tempting for the Assad loyalists and their backers to refrain from at least taking a shot at restoring the old regime. Such a coup would most likely fail — while plunging the country into bloodshed once again.

Forced friendship

One of the main restraints preventing Sharaa from sliding into a truly brutal dictatorship is his dependence on international recognition, the lifting of the economic sanctions strangling Syria’s fragile economy, and foreign investment. Within two weeks after coming to power, Sharaa was already receiving a delegation of high‑ranking American diplomats in Damascus. Soon afterward, the United States canceled the $10 million reward that had been offered for his head as an al‑Qaeda field commander.

Since then, the sanctions imposed on Assad’s Syria have been gradually eased. The harshest measures under the so-called “Caesar Act” have been suspended, and it appears the law may be fully repealed by the U.S. Congress in the coming year. Most Western European countries, whose government ministers have become frequent visitors to Sharaa, have also lifted their sanctions. He has also become the first Syrian head of state in history to be received by a U.S. president at the White House.

Although he tries to maintain a facade of unwavering dignity, Sharaa leaves the impression of a vain man. He appears flattered that world leaders treat him as an equal — Donald Trump warmly welcomed him to the White House, calling him a “great guy,” while Vladimir Putin courteously received him at the Kremlin.

But Sharaa's new connections present a certain issue domestically. For years, Russian aviation bombed Sunni areas, killing, among others, Sharaa’s allies. The Assad dictatorship, which ravaged the country, relied heavily on Russian boots — or rather, bombers. Are all of those crimes simply forgotten and forgiven now?

In an Al Jazeera documentary timed with the first anniversary of Liberation Day, Sharaa himself revealed that Russia threatened him, trying to halt the rebels’ advance on Damascus. “When we took control of western Aleppo, a message came from Russia: ‘Stop at this stage, be satisfied with what you have achieved, or there will be escalation.’ But I saw in this threat a sign of weakness, that the regime was collapsing, and so the operation continued. Fortunately, that decision proved correct,” he said. Yet even these recollections do not prevent the president of the new Syria from engaging with Russian leaders.

What are his reasons? Sharaa himself says that Syria, faced with hostility from Israel and persisting international sanctions, needs every vote in the UN Security Council it can get — including Russia’s.

But other factors are also pushing him toward cooperation. Syria needs Russian wheat, investment, and assistance in restoring its energy sector. A Russian military delegation, led by Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, recently visited Damascus to discuss the situation. For his part, Sharaa never speaks about the war in Ukraine, although he has also moved to establish friendly relations with Kyiv. Yet Ukraine can offer relatively little to Syria, aside from small-scale wheat deliveries.

It is interesting to consider the foreign policy role of Maher al-Sharaa, the president’s older brother, who has reportedly headed his presidential executive office. Maher al-Sharaa accompanied his brother on the trip to Moscow and may have helped prepare it. Some regard him as an agent of Putin’s influence, citing aspects of Maher’s biography as evidence: he studied in Voronezh, lived there for many years, married a Russian woman called Tatyana Zakirova, and worked as a doctor, at one point heading the gynecology department of a local hospital for railway workers. But these facts alone prove nothing.

Ahmed al-Sharaa has repeatedly emphasized that, in Syria's tragic circumstances — shaped by 50 years of Assad dictatorship and 14 years of civil war — the country needs friendly relations and cooperation with everyone — perhaps with the exception of Iran, which Syrians regard as the main accomplice in the Assads’ crimes.

Western governments consider Sharaa the only leader realistically capable of ensuring stability and preventing a relapse of civil war in Syria, which in turn could trigger outbreaks of violence — including new conflicts in the Middle East. Even with Sharaa in place, Western diplomats acknowledge that the conditions for such a war still exist. The deep scars left by Syria's dictatorship and brutal sectarian conflict are far from healed.