The role of personality in Syrian history: How al-Julani rose to power through ISIS and al-Qaeda to become a “Traitor to Jihad”

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Many believe that without Lenin’s talents, ruthlessness, and fanatical obsession with seizing power, the October Revolution — and, by extension, 70 years of Soviet rule — might never have happened. Those who uphold the idea of an individual’s capacity to make an impact on history should also agree that without a man named Ahmad al-Sharaa — better known by his revolutionary alias Abu Muhammad al-Julani — the current Syrian revolution might not have occurred. At the very least, it would not have happened so swiftly, and not with such relatively minor bloodshed.

Of course, the fall of the Syrian regime had numerous other causes. First, the significant weakening of Assad’s allies — Hezbollah and Tehran — due to Israel's highly effective strikes. Second, Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine. Third, the shortsightedness of Assad and his entourage, who not only neglected the material needs of the deeply impoverished population but also failed to meet the basic requirements of their own military. Syrian soldiers had endured years of laughably low wages, condemning them to near-starvation conditions.

The Assad regime was probably doomed regardless, but its agony still could have dragged on for several more years, bringing countless new calamities to the Syrian people. Instead, a convergence of numerous factors caused the five-decade reign of the Assad clan’s terrorist regime to collapse like a house of cards. It was destroyed in just 12 days — the time that passed between the launch of the rebel offensive in the northern province of Idlib to Bashar al-Assad's disgraceful flight to Moscow.

On Nov. 30, when combat units of the Levant Liberation Organization (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, HTS) captured Syria’s second largest city practically without a fight, the emir of the organization appeared in the center of town. Standing on the steps of Aleppo’s famous medieval citadel, he addressed residents. Many were struck by the fact that he was not dressed in the traditional garb of an Islamic warrior but instead wore a distinctly secular khaki military uniform. Remarkably, the emir was unarmed, and even his guards and aides arrived to the meeting without weaponry.

A few days later, the emir appeared in much the same manner in the center of Damascus, which had surrendered without resistance (though by this time, some of his bodyguards carried rifles). This marked the beginning of a transformation not only in the man’s style of dress, but also in his name. He now identifies himself not by the typically Islamist alias Abu Muhammad al-Julani, but by the name given to him by his parents — Ahmad al-Sharaa.

The reasoning behind these changes is clear: they are meant to align with a new course of action in which HTS and its leader seek to position themselves as representatives of all Syrians, rather than solely of its Sunni community.

Evidence of this intention can be seen in the events that unfolded in Qardaha, a town predominantly inhabited by Alawites, the most privileged sect under the previous regime. Intense negotiations there lasted 36 hours, culminating in local community leaders agreeing to cooperate with the new authorities.

Qardaha is a highly symbolic place. Hafez al-Assad, who ruled Syria with an iron fist for 30 years, was born there. After his death, his son Bashar — now resident in Moscow — inherited the dictatorship, holding power for another 24 years. Qardaha was home to an opulent mausoleum dedicated to Assad the elder — until local youth set fire to the edifice, destroying the dictator’s tomb.

The rebels managed to peacefully assert control over another Alawite city, the key Mediterranean port of Latakia, where local youth are also at work enthusiastically dismantling memorials and tearing down statues of the Assads.

Although the transformation occurred suddenly, it was not effected overnight. Over the past four years, HTS has benefited from generous financial support from Qatar, which allowed it to make significant investments in enhancing its combat capabilities and the professionalism of its armed forces. The group established a qualified officer corps, special forces units, sabotage teams, and a division for operating combat drones. Fairly large-scale production of rockets and ammunition was also set up. As a result, HTS fighters proved far superior to Assad’s impoverished and starving army, which was scarcely capable of effective resistance.

An even more crucial factor in the victory was the diplomatic skill of Sharaa-Julani. His strategy of cooperation with other communities had been adopted several years prior. Long before the decisive phase of the offensive, he managed to open up dialogue not only with his fellow Sunnis, but also with leaders of minorities and groups traditionally hostile to HTS.

For instance, in northern Hama, unofficial but fairly active contacts were established with Ismailis, as well as with certain commanders in the regime's army in Damascus. This diplomatic work paved the way for mass desertions among soldiers and allowed for the capture of large territories without a fight. Unlike the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, HTS also managed to reach an understanding with Kurdish forces.

Rumors about the effective governance established in Idlib by Sharaa’s Salvation Government spread far beyond the province. In Aleppo, local community elders began calling on him to send armed forces to their areas to restore basic order. By extending an appeal for cooperation to Christians, Alawites, Kurds, and other minorities across Syria, Sharaa set a significant precedent — one that will likely be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reverse. In the eyes of radical Islamists, however, this outreach has cemented his status as a traitor to jihad, an act for which there can be no forgiveness.

Sharaa had already made many enemies even within Idlib, where supporters of al-Qaeda and ISIS, when not staging noisy protests, have attempted to assassinate him. In those cases, he responded by cracking down, arresting the instigators. Now, however, Sharaa must exercise greater caution and avoid appearing in public without the proper security. Some of his sworn enemies have managed to escape imprisonment, and there is little doubt that a serious hunt for him is already underway.

Sharaa is described as a genius opportunist, with many recalling how skillfully he exploited jihadist organizations. He arrived in Idlib from Iraq as an emissary of ISIS, generously supplied with money, weapons, and vital connections. However, he soon broke ties with ISIS, securing the support of al-Qaeda instead. Later, he betrayed al-Qaeda after he felt he had gained enough independent power in Idlib. The militant group he created, Jabhat al-Nusra, was considered an al-Qaeda affiliate, but Sharaa immediately declared that it would not engage in jihad outside of Syria.

It is clear that this was a message to the West: “See, I am no threat to anyone except for the Assad regime.” However, the West did not believe him and hastily declared both the organization and its leader terrorists, with the U.S. even offering a $10 million reward for his capture. When Sharaa broke with al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra was restructured and renamed HTS. This was not just a cosmetic change: a purge began within the organization, as it rid itself both of fervent fanatics, and of those members who were unwilling to accept the absolute authority of the leader.

Nevertheless, Sharaa could not afford to abandon his Islamist image immediately. He needed to come up with a “respectable” justification for cooperating with non-believers — one that would be acceptable to the Sunni masses. He brought the theologian Abd al-Rahim Attun closer to him, making him head of the Sharia Council. With the theologian’s help, a solution was found: members of all other faiths were given the status of musta'min — guests of the Islamic community — who must be protected and provided with safety and well-being.

Theoretically, this status can be revoked at any time, and “guests” are still not equal to “hosts” in terms of rights. Still, in the current situation, these are mere nuances. There is little doubt that, if necessary, the “great opportunist” will find some new solution.

Another idea that Attun and Sharaa came up with was to replace the traditional black flag of the jihadists with a white one bearing the same old inscription: “There is no god but Allah.” Alongside it, the new authorities now raise the flag of Syria — not the one used under Assad, but the one adopted by the country after it gained independence. Alongside this banner, the white flag no longer looks quite so ominous.

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa was born in 1982 in Saudi Arabia. His father, a graduate of Baghdad University, was a widely recognized expert in the economics of the oil industry and authored several important theoretical works. However, the al-Sharaa family came from Syria’s Golan Heights, an origin that would later be reflected in Ahmed's chosen nisba, a nickname replacing his surname: al-Julani (or Jolani), meaning “man from the Golan.”

Ahmed was seven years old when his family returned to Syria, where they lived in one of the most prosperous bourgeois neighborhoods of Damascus. At school, he had a reputation as a diligent student, but he was also a loner. In his final years of school, he shocked those around him by falling seriously in love with a girl from an Alawite family, and she, it seemed, reciprocated his feelings.

Talk of marriage soon emerged, but the families on both sides opposed the idea, separating the Syrian Romeo and Juliet. However, it can be assumed that this first love left an impression on Ahmed’s memory.

At 17, his unrequited love was replaced by an interest in Arab nationalist — and, later, Islamist — ideologies. The sight of planes crashing into the World Trade Center deeply shocked his youthful imagination. In the early 2000s, he went to Iraq, where after the fall of Saddam Hussein he joined the anti-American resistance, ultimately ending up in the Camp Bucca detention facility. Journalists would later call this prison the “incubator of jihadism” — it was here that the group “Al-Qaeda in Iraq” was likely born. It went on to form the foundation for ISIS.

All the future leaders of the movement were held there, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Sharaa joined this group and made a favorable impression on one of the jihadist leaders, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, who suggested sending the young Syrian back to his homeland to establish an ISIS affiliate there. In 2011, after five years in American captivity, he seemingly enthusiastically took on this task, although it is likely that he had different, more personal plans from the outset. This marked the beginning of his rise to power.

Malicious critics, who consider Sharaa a traitor, spread a conspiracy theory claiming that he was recruited in the camp and later appeared in Syria as a deeply undercover American agent. This, they suggest, explains his current shift. However, there is minimal evidence to support the theory, and the official announcement by the U.S. State Department of a $10 million reward for his capture does not align with the idea that he is an agent of Washington.

Nevertheless, it is true that the Idlib-based Salvation Government maintained contacts with the West. Sharaa appointed another ally of his, Muhammad al-Bashir, a communications engineer with a university degree, as head of this organization. Al-Bashir clearly demonstrated the qualities of an effective manager, and after HTS forces entered Damascus, Sharaa appointed him as the acting prime minister of all of Syria.

In the streets of Syrian cities, jubilant crowds celebrated their liberation from Assad’s dictatorship. Detention facilities were opened, and tens of thousands of political prisoners were freed — some of whom were Sharaa's bitter enemies. The “White Helmets” discovered numerous bodies with clear signs of horrific torture in the country's most notorious prison, Saydnaya.

Sharaa announced rewards for the capture of the intelligence officers and executioners who perpetrated these crimes on behalf of the Assad regime. It is believed that at least 150,000 people were tortured to death in the dungeons. Over the course of the civil war, more than 500,000 Syrians died, and 13 million have been forced to leave their homes. Six million have fled abroad. Now, many of them are rushing to return.

Meanwhile, Western countries are suspending the processing of asylum applications from Syrians one by one. In Germany alone, hundreds of thousands of Syrians already hold temporary status, and the local population — there and elsewhere in Europe — hopes they will soon return to their homeland.

In general, the issue of refugees and immigrants, both legal and illegal, is leading to the rise of far-right parties and populist demagogues in the West. Their ascent to power threatens to lead to a severe crisis for liberal democracy and market economies.

It is no surprise that the prospect of another wave of refugees — a predictable outcome in the event of a new outbreak of civil war in Syria — terrifies Western leaders. Therefore, it is in the West’s enlightened self-interest to support efforts to normalize life in Syria as soon as possible, to promote its economic recovery, and to prevent further interfaith conflicts. Extremely worrying reports are already coming from the Kurdish regions in the north and from Deir ez-Zor in the east, where pro-Turkish forces are advancing, carrying out reprisals against the Kurds. This spark could ignite the whole country.

How is all of this connected to the personality of Ahmed al-Sharaa? In the most direct manner. The West would benefit from urgently removing the terrorist label from him, revoking the bounty on his head, and beginning to cooperate with him and his government. Otherwise, dealing with him will be impossible.

Of course, such a process of rehabilitation usually takes many months, if not years. However, under the current circumstances, there is no other potential partner with the capacity to make or break order in the country. Yes, there are the pro-Western Kurds, who have long deserved state independence, but on their own, they cannot determine the situation on the ground. Sharaa, uniquely, can.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer disavowed a statement made by one of his ministers, who promised to set an example by lifting the terrorism charge against Sharaa. This was a mistake. After all, what alternative is there? To wait for new partners to emerge? It is clear that in the near future, there will be none, and meanwhile, without external support, Syria risks falling back into a catastrophic civil war.

In desperation, Sharaa’s new government may be forced to rely on Putin's Russia, and hints of such a possibility are already being made. Sharaa has assured Moscow that he would like “good relations” and that its two military bases on Syrian territory will remain untouched.

Is there risk in a decision to legitimize the new government and bet on partnerships with its leader? Of course there is, and that risk is significant. There are no guarantees that the “great opportunist” won't change his course 180 degrees if it proves advantageous to him. It is even possible that, under certain conditions, he might revive his jihadist ways. Only one outcome appears certain: Sharaa certainly will not be building any sort of liberal democracy.

So why bet on him at all? At best, Sharaa’s sustained rule would mean the creation of a relatively mild authoritarian regime capable of maintaining the country’s unity and ensuring its economic development without mass repression or sectarian conflict. But given that there is no force poised to turn Syria into a Western-style democracy anytime soon, Sharaa remains the best available alternative.

I’ve seen Western efforts to court promising Soviet leaders. One of them — the charm offensive aimed at Gorbachev — helped end the Cold War. Another — the one involving Putin — completely failed. What will Sharaa turn out to be: Syria's Gorbachev, or its Putin? A successful reformer, or yet another dictator?

No one can predict how his evolution will unfold. All his talents, combined with his sharp mind, political cunning, intuition, and charisma, have a flip side. It is clear that he is extremely ambitious and power-hungry, and we know the dangers such traits pose. Will Ahmed al-Sharaa become yet another despot? It is entirely possible. Yet the risk of not cooperating with him — a revived civil war, the exacerbation of ethnic rivalries, and another wave of refugees — is still worse than the risk inherent in assisting Sharaa’s ambitions to consolidate power in Damascus. There are still chances for a less-than-catastrophic outcome to the Syrian crisis, and failing to seize them would be foolish — even criminal.