The new boss in Syria: Is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s evolution away from jihad for real?

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Birth through defeat

On a chilly March day in 2014, hundreds of Syrian opposition fighters, along with their wives and children, hastily fled the medieval fortress of Krak des Chevaliers — a UNESCO World Heritage Site — to escape the overwhelming forces of Bashar al-Assad's army. Originally built a millennium ago by Kurdish commanders and later extensively reconstructed by Crusader Hospitallers (who would later become the Knights of Malta), Krak des Chevaliers had been seized by opposition forces early on in the civil war that had broken out in 2011. For nearly three years, it stood as one of the main strongholds of the various Islamist forces who dared to challenge the authority of the regime in Damascus.

The massive stone structure, with its thick walls, earthen ramparts, and sprawling underground tunnels, served as an ideal refuge for the fighters, who transformed the medieval monks’ cells into storage rooms for weapons and supplies, used the courtyards for physical training and weapons practice, and held prayers and sermons in the Hospitallers’ chapel — which had been converted into a mosque centuries ago. The sermons often called for a holy war against the rule of heretics and apostates.

Located on a high hill near the Lebanese border, the castle had long served as a strategic hub. Smugglers from the neighboring country supplied opposition forces there with everything from ammunition to foreign volunteers eager to join the Syrian jihad. Krak des Chevaliers became one of the key transit points in the complex logistical network of opposition groups.

Assad’s forces, for their part, tried to dislodge the opposition from the castle, bombarding its walls with heavy artillery and dropping bombs from aircraft. Eventually, government infantry supported by tanks and artillery breached the fortress. Jihadist commanders ordered their fighters to retreat, taking only the bare essentials as they withdrew.

Reports suggest that at the time of the government’s unexpected offensive in 2014, between 300 and 700 armed men were inside the castle. But they were not alone. Families of the fighters, along with residents of nearby villages burned by Assad’s forces, had also sought refuge behind the structure’s medieval walls. The total number of those forced to flee the no-longer-secure stronghold may have been more than one thousand people.

They left behind weapon stockpiles, a library, and numerous personal belongings, which fell into the hands of their adversaries. For months, government-run television channels aired footage from the captured castle, showcasing relics from the daily life of the fleeing opposition fighters. Particular attention was devoted to the discovery of contraceptive pills and theological books. “Only savages,” state propaganda claimed, “could so easily mix base physical desires with elevated spiritual pursuits.” At the time, the name of these so-called “savages” was on everyone’s lips: they were known as Jabhat al-Nusra — the “Front of Victory.”

An offshoot of al-Qaeda

Jabhat al-Nusra was a product of the Syrian civil war, an organization that likely never would have emerged absent the conflict. Its members were Sunni Muslims who opposed both Bashar al-Assad's regime and the so-called moderate opposition. Their goal was to establish a true Islamic state in Syria, governed by Sharia law. They distrusted the moderate opposition, which envisioned a democratic and secular Syria.

Unsurprisingly, Jabhat al-Nusra had ties to al-Qaeda. At the time, it was rare to find a jihadist in the Middle East who wasn’t connected to al-Qaeda in some way. Shortly after its formation, Jabhat al-Nusra was added to the U.S. list of terrorist organizations as an al-Qaeda affiliate, and within months, al-Qaeda leadership had publicly acknowledged the Syrian jihadists as part of their network.

During the early phase of the war, from 2012 to 2016, connections with al-Qaeda could even serve as a mark of credibility for Syrians seeking to join the radical factions of the uprising. Moderate pro-Western forces, initially successful in the conflict’s early months, soon fell into infighting, became implicated in crimes against civilians, and predictably lost favor among Syrians. Under the circumstances, the presence of al-Qaeda ties was often less problematic than their absence.

As a result, these moderate groups faded into the background, yielding leadership in the fight against Assad to jihadist factions. Around the same time, a splinter group of commanders and fighters broke away from al-Qaeda, accusing the parent organization of insufficient radicalism. This faction came to be known as ISIS.

ISIS declared enemies on all sides: Assad, the secular opposition, and even al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra. Interestingly, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, was once a subordinate of ISIS’s first self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and had even pledged allegiance to him during their time together as al-Qaeda militants.

By 2015, however, their paths had fully diverged. In an interview with Al Jazeera, al-Julani referred to his former commander as a “schismatic” and criticized ISIS for harming the fight against Assad by indiscriminately killing both supporters and opponents of the regime. The head of Jabhat al-Nusra accused ISIS of excessive brutality and claimed that, unlike al-Baghdadi’s group, his organization had no intention of waging war against the West and posed no threat to the U.S. or Europe.

In this interview, as in all previous ones, al-Julani appeared with his face hidden under a black hood. He had every reason to conceal his identity — both Assad and the U.S. were after him, as were many of his former comrades who had joined ISIS.

ISIS was both more ideologically extreme and more militarily successful than Jabhat al-Nusra. The new group's ideologues were not content with just Syria — they called for global jihad and crafted ambitious plans to attract radicals from around the world. In mere months, ISIS became the leading force in the conflict, expanding beyond Syria and seizing vast territories in Iraq.

The emergence of this hyper-radical group, determined to dominate at least the entire Middle East, compelled Western democracies to intervene and form an anti-ISIS coalition. This coalition eventually included approximately 90 countries and international institutions. Its primary tool in the fight against the jihadists became airstrikes targeting ISIS bases and supply convoys.

Operating under the logic of “we're already involved, so there's no point holding back,” Western militaries and their Middle Eastern allies did not limit their attacks to ISIS alone. They also targeted al-Qaeda-affiliated structures, including Jabhat al-Nusra.

Seeking recognition

Most likely, it was the desire to protect his people and resources from Western bombs that drove the rapid transformation of Jabhat al-Nusra and its leader. In the summer of 2016, al-Julani appeared in public for the first time, revealing his face to announce a complete break with al-Qaeda and also with any other external actors.

As a demonstration of the seriousness of his intentions, al-Juliani even dissolved the organization and created a new one in its place. Jabhat al-Nusra was replaced by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (“The Front for the Conquest of the Levant”), but the Americans did not believe the rebranding was sincere. They continued to treat al-Julani's group as a terrorist organization.

Incidentally, the naysayers could find support for their arguments in the rhetoric of the leader himself and in the actions of his subordinates. Al-Juliani called for the expulsion of Shiites from Syria, endorsed the violent conversion of Druze to Sunni Islam, and exploited local Christians, sanctioning the confiscation of their property and approving the imposition of a special tax on them — jizya, which non-Muslims must pay for the right to live and work among Muslims. Of course, this behavior was not on the level of ISIS, which burned live people to death, but it was far from what the West had hoped for from an organization advocating to be removed from the terrorist list.

Political chameleon

In 2017, al-Julani once again reorganized his group in response to rapidly changing circumstances. By that time, ISIS had been largely defeated by the Western coalition. Assad, supported by Iran and Russia, had solidified control over the major cities in the west and center of the country. The moderate opposition had dwindled to a small group of refugees, fighting for media attention after having fled their homeland. And the jihadists, including al-Julani's followers, had been pushed to the far north, to Idlib, a province bordering Turkey.

It was in Idlib that Jabhat al-Nusra, now rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, experienced yet another transformation. After several smaller factions expressed a desire to join Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and recognize its leader as their commander, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), or the Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, was formed.

The group’s ideological and organizational evolution struggled to keep up with its frequent name changes. By 2021, in a report by the UN Human Rights Council, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was accused of illegal detentions, rape, torture, and other crimes. The scale of its abuses appeared second only to that of ISIS, and electoral democracy was among the values HTS firmly rejected.

And yet, American interest in targeting al-Julani declined dramatically. True, the former Abu Gharaib detainee has been on the FBI’s most-wanted list since 2013 — with a $10 million bounty on his head, no less — but as former U.S. Special Representative for Syria James Jeffrey admitted in 2021, the Americans stopped hunting for the HTS leader in 2018. Jeffrey explained this change saying that the organization headed by al-Juliani had become the “least evil” among all the factions operating in Idlib.

This statement sparked numerous conspiracy theories, most of which revolved around the assumption that al-Julani had been recruited by the Americans during his time in captivity and was acting in their interests. The reality, however, is likely more mundane. As Ambassador Jeffrey stated, after years of conflict, HTS became almost the only opposition force capable of challenging Assad, and it did so while repeatedly emphasizing its lack of a desire to confront the West.

Pragmatic and strategic, al-Julani wisely distanced himself from al-Qaeda and, just as strategically, opposed ISIS. It is even possible that he really did strike an informal deal with the U.S., abandoning the most radical elements of his political agenda in exchange for the Americans’ agreement to cease in its pursuit of the leader and his inner circle.

One piece of indirect evidence of such an arrangement is the face of al-Julani’s sudden, unprecedented visibility. In Idlib, he frequently appeared in public, happily posed for photos, and made no effort to hide.

Even more significant was the shift in HTS's attitude toward religious minorities. The group returned nearly all the property it had seized from Christians in Idlib, allowed church services to take place, and renounced the forced conversion of Druze to Sunni Islam. Al-Juliani even called on non-Muslim refugees to return to the province, offering them protection.

“I want to emphasize that our war today is not a war against religions or sects, but a struggle to end the oppression of people by a criminal regime,” al-Julani said in 2021 during his first interview with American media. He called on Washington to reverse the decision that labeled him a terrorist and his organization as a terrorist group — officially at least, there has been no response to these requests.

It must be acknowledged that HTS and its leader have undergone significant changes in recent years. Unlike the figure he cut as late as 2017, Al-Julani is no longer the desert warrior with a turban on his head, endlessly preaching about Sharia and jihad. Instead, he has become the leader of a force that defeated a corrupt, sadistic regime. As such, he will bear a significant share of the responsibility for Syria’s future.

Syria's uncertain future

The former field commander seems to be distancing himself as much as possible from the jihadist ideology that once defined him. He now promises to respect the rights of Christians and women, to protect minorities, to establish good relations with neighboring countries, and to build effective state institutions in Damascus and beyond. What he does not address, however, is how these institutions will actually be structured.

Notably, al-Juliani has not raised the possibility of holding elections and has yet to respond to a call from Syria’s still-serving Prime Minister Mohammad Jalali to form new governing bodies through popular vote.

But defining the country’s political future is far from the only challenge al-Julani faces. After all, the war is far from over. Syria remains deeply divided, with various factions controlling different parts of the country, often in conflict with one another.

Another important factor also must not be overlooked: the leader of HTS holds personal grievances with a highly dangerous adversary — Israel. The new Syrian leader’s parents were refugees from the Golan Heights, a Syrian region occupied by Israel in 1967 and annexed in 1981. The importance of the Golan Heights issue to al-Julani is underscored by his very name. Originally named Ahmad Hussein al-Sharaa, he adopted the name al-Julani after choosing the path of jihad. In Arabic, the Golan Heights are called al-Julani, and if HTS manages to establish even a moderately stable governance structure in Syria, the Golan Heights could become a new geopolitical flashpoint.