Farther right: even as the AfD grows more radical and popular, electoral victory remains elusive

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The Path to the far right

In the 2010s, Germany’s traditional political landscape underwent significant changes. The famous dictum of Franz Josef Strauß, who declared it unacceptable for any parliamentary party to exist to the right of the CDU/CSU, lost its relevance. The creation of the Alternative for Germany broke old taboos, and in 2013, the year of its founding congress, the party nearly made it into the Bundestag.

In the ensuing years, the populist-right party gained seats in parliaments at all levels. Even its staunchest opponents cannot deny that the AfD has solidified its place within the Federal Republic's political spectrum, even as the movement has grown more extreme.

Even many Germans may have forgotten that the project’s original initiators were far from radical right-wingers. The founder and first party chair, Bernd Lucke, a professor of economics at the University of Hamburg, initially proposed a financial-economic alternative to Angela Merkel's policies. His approach resembled contemporary Trumpism: national self-interest and strict protectionism rather than pan-European solidarity and open markets. While this concept was rejected by most democratic politicians in Germany, it was not rooted in far-right ideology.

However, influential players and political strategists within the AfD were not satisfied with the prospect of remaining a small party of “rebel professors.” They saw a significant electorate that had not yet found representation in mainstream politics: staunch opponents of migration, of multiculturalism, of diversity, of globalization, and of European unity itself.

For Germany’s far-right, the choices were limited: reluctantly continuing to vote for conservatives who, under Angela Merkel, had drifted toward a near-centrist position; casting their vote for minor extremist parties like the NPD, which had no realistic chance of gaining parliamentary seats; or disengaging from the electoral process entirely. Now, however, they had their own “alternative.”

Three factors converged to shape the party's trajectory:

• The ideological leanings of a significant number of AfD members,
• Societal demand for a far-right agenda,
• The ambitions of former low-profile politicians and public figures to rise to the forefront of Germany’s political scene.

Overall, the project succeeded. The AfD pushed out other far-right forces (some of which were compelled to disband entirely), it gained broad representation in government (the Bundestag, all 16 state parliaments, the European Parliament, and nearly all local councils nationwide), and it established itself as the dominant force to the right of the CDU/CSU.

Only a decade ago, Germany was considered a unique bastion of democratic stability. Now, like many other European states, it too has a far-right political party in parliament. The cost of this development has been a pronounced shift to the right (as far as the law permits), resistance from a significant portion of society, surveillance by German intelligence agencies, and ongoing internal turbulence within the party. The AfD has experienced no fewer than three internal coups, during which previous leadership was ousted and replaced by even more radical figures.

Former leaders of the Alternative for Germany have been outspoken in their criticism of their old party. Jörg Meuthen, the party's co-chair until 2022, stated that, “The AfD has become so radical that it no longer adheres to fundamental principles of freedom and democracy. During the pandemic, it even took on the characteristics of a cult. This is not a party one can vote for.”

“I look with regret at what the party has become. We wanted a different policy on the euro, and now this party wants a different country,” lamented Bernd Lucke, the first chair of the AfD (2013–2015).

Pre-election rebranding?

Following the collapse of the ruling coalition — and with the upcoming snap parliamentary elections set for February 23 — experts do not rule out a reduction in the AfD’s radicalism. They point to the example of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party, which has distanced itself from classic post-fascist positions, and French National Rally leader Marine Le Pen, who now strives to cultivate the image of a national-conservative rather than of a far-right firebrand.

Hopes are currently being placed on the current head of the AfD, Alice Weidel, an openly gay woman. She stands in contrast to the party’s other co-chair, Tino Chrupalla, known for his anti-migrant and pro-Putin rhetoric. Weidel’s statements in favor of same-sex civil partnerships, her support for inviting qualified migrants to Germany, and her overall support for Germany's membership in the European Union are seen as offering a moderate alternative to the extremist factions within the party. Notably, it was Weidel, not Chrupalla, who was chosen as the AfD’s candidate for chancellor in December.

The electorate seems to have noticed. In mid-December, in a poll on trust in politicians leading their party's electoral lists, Weidel garnered 21% — the same level as the likely next chancellor, conservative leader Friedrich Merz. Trust in Weidel even outstrips the overall rating of her party over the same period (18–19%).

Scandals don’t matter

The year 2024 was particularly rich in scandals involving the AfD. In January, journalists published information about a secret meeting of far-right extremists at which a “re-migration” project was discussed — the removal from Germany of foreign-born individuals deemed “undesirable,” even if they hold German citizenship. Senior members of the AfD attended the meeting. Björn Höcke, leader of the party’s far-right wing, demanded “exclusive loyalty” from all residents of Germany with migrant roots, threatening deportation for those who were “undecided.”

Just before the May European Parliament elections, two leading AfD candidates — incumbent MEP Maximilian Krah and a key party figure in Bavaria, Petr Bystron — found themselves at the center of scandals. In an interview, Krah openly relativized the crimes of the SS during World War II, and he also became a subject of investigation due to his close ties to the government structures of Russia and China — possibly even receiving financial compensation from the intelligence services of these states. His assistant was arrested.

Bystron, at the time a Bundestag member, was accused of money laundering and corruption involving Russians. He also faced scrutiny after helping a Polish citizen who was arrested for espionage on behalf of Russia to infiltrate the Bundestag building. Bystron was stripped of parliamentary immunity.

Such events seemed likely to diminish support for the AfD among “conservative national patriots,” as the party’s voters often describe themselves. However, nothing of the sort occurred. Before the information about Krah and Bystron was published, AfD's rating fluctuated between 15% and 17%. Subsequent polls showed it to be 14% to 16%. The party's result in the European elections was 15.9% — second place in Germany. And no significant decrease in support for the AfD was noted in either federal or state-level polls.

Four months later, the AfD won elections in Thuringia and finished second in Saxony and Brandenburg. In-depth sociological studies revealed that in several German regions and specific societal niches, an electoral base for the AfD had formed. Simply put, there are Germans who are ready to vote for the party under any circumstances, regardless of scandals or damaging information that seems to stand in contrast to their stated beliefs. These voters see the AfD as their only representative, and they support its radicalism.

Radical program – 2025

The party ideologues understand this and, in the upcoming snap elections, are offering voters perhaps the most radical proposals since the AfD's inception. The full text of the election program has not yet been published, but from the official draft version, it is clear that the party advocates for Germany’s exit from the European Union, a return to the German mark, the full resumption of Russian gas supplies, the lifting of sanctions against Russia, and the preemptive imprisonment of asylum seekers in Germany — directly at the border.

The AfD also refuses to condemn Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, and it permits abortion only in exceptional cases. These proposals do not align with the expected “positive rebranding” of the party and symbolize a hardening even of its previous positions. The new drafts are notably more radical than similar documents from other right-wing parties across Europe.

Alice Weidel, despite her reputation as a relative moderate, does not deviate from the general line of her party. At an AfD rally in Magdeburg, the city where a terrorist attack in December claimed the lives of five visitors at the local Christmas market, she habitually blamed the attack on “Islamists” — even though the terrorist was a committed Islamophobe who had established contacts with the AfD.

Weidel also does not resist the party's openly homophobic stance, which not only “opposes” so-called “LGBT-friendly policies,” but also mocks transgender people, stating that it is now supposedly possible to “choose your gender once a year.” She has also not criticized the current points of the AfD's preliminary program, such as Germany's exit from the EU and abandoning the euro, which contradict her positions as an economist. Moreover, as a candidate for chancellor, Weidel has stated her readiness to present these theses to voters.

The relationship between Weidel and Björn Höcke is telling. While in 2017 the current AfD leader openly declared her readiness to expel the Thuringian extremist from the party, by 2020 she opposed the then co-chair of the AfD, Jörg Meuthen, who intended to ban the far-right internal party group The Wing, which was led by Höcke. At a meeting of the federal leadership, Weidel voted against dissolving the group.

Throughout 2024, the AfD consistently ranked second in national polls, behind only the CSU/CDU (31-33%). Its popularity currently stands at 17-19%, with its closest competitor for runner-up, the Social Democrats (SPD), coming in at 16-17%. The party traditionally enjoys higher levels of support in the former East Germany, reaching up to 30%, but contrary to stereotypes, it also has significant backing in several western regions, including the economically successful states of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg (both 16%), and Hesse (17%).

In mid-January, the AfD plans to hold a federal congress and approve its election program, which is unlikely to be more moderate than the main points already presented to the public. The leadership understands that further radicalization aligns with the party strategists' goals — the AfD already has a stable electorate, and this group is ready to support the party even if a particular point or two in the program seems to cross the line. Meanwhile, hard radicalism should help AfD gain votes from another electoral “reservoir” — Germans who tend to ignore elections and who previously considered even the AfD to be part of the establishment.

Unsurprisingly, extremists hold strong positions in the party and are extremely influential. Höcke continues to play a key role, and he and his trusted allies control many local processes. Höcke also has a reputation as a successful politician, as under his leadership the Thuringian AfD took first place in the regional elections this past September. It is worth noting that before her nomination as the AfD's list leader, Weidel visited the Thuringian capital, Erfurt, and spoke alongside Höcke at a joint rally. Without the demonstrative support of the party's main extremist, her chances for leadership would have been lower.

What’s next

A group of Bundestag deputies, led by CDU parliamentarian Marco Wanderwitz, planned to initiate a review of the possibility of banning the AfD due to its incompatibility with the constitutional-democratic principles of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, experts agree that there is currently insufficient evidence to justify banning the AfD via the Constitutional Court, and the party is therefore likely to be allowed to participate in the February elections.

It can be predicted with a high degree of certainty that the AfD will significantly expand its presence in the Bundestag. If the party's current maximum polling numbers reflected the actual vote, it would secure 137 mandates — more than one and a half times the 83 seats it won in the 2021 elections. Even with a potential dip in its ratings, which has been observed in previous years, and despite the traditional departure of some deputies from the faction during the term (seven lawmakers left after 2021, eight in the previous term), the AfD will remain an influential political force in the next parliament.

However, the AfD is destined to remain in the opposition. All other parties with a realistic chance of entering parliament (CDU, CSU, SPD, the Green Party, the liberal FDP, the Left Party, and the Sahra Wagenknecht Bloc) have already publicly ruled out forming a coalition government with the far-right, meaning that the political isolation of the AfD is set to continue. Cooperation with the AfD would lead to a significant loss of support, even for Wagenknecht’s party, let alone the traditional giants of German politics.

Thus, the AfD will neither come to power nor fully integrate into the political landscape of the Federal Republic of Germany, remaining a pariah, as has already occurred with their counterparts in several other European countries. However, it cannot be ruled out that certain factions within the democratic parties may seek to cooperate with the radicals in the future, especially if no stable majority is formed in the Bundestag following the 2025 elections.