Unfaithful offspring: How the Afghan Taliban turned against Pakistan and why the threat of a new war is real

RU

A souvenir from the Taliban, courtesy of Pakistan

There is nothing more quintessentially British than cricket. Every other island invention — from Protestantism to tanks — has successfully taken root in various parts of the world. Only cricket remains popular almost exclusively in the UK and in countries that were once its colonies or dominions during the imperial era.

Of the twelve full-member teams of the International Cricket Council, eleven represent former parts of the British Empire. The twelfth is the only nation that is passionately devoted to cricket despite never having been part of the British Empire: Afghanistan. The sport is so beloved there that after the Taliban seized power in 2021, their government agreed to the International Cricket Council's demand to retain the Afghan national team’s tricolor flag rather than switching to the new white banner emblazoned with the shahada.

The old flag represents the government the Taliban loathed and fought against for decades. From the outset, the new authorities in Kabul sought to purge any symbols associated with their predecessors. However, changing the national team’s flag would have risked Afghanistan’s exclusion from international tournaments, as the Taliban regime and its symbols have not been recognized by the global community. In this instance, the otherwise uncompromising Taliban avoided a conflict, allowing the team to continue competing under the flag of the now-defunct Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

To understand how the Taliban came to tolerate cricket, one must delve into the sport’s history in Afghanistan — a history that began relatively recently. Numerous sources trace the rise of cricket’s popularity in the country to the return of refugees from neighboring Pakistan after the Soviet invasion ended in 1989. In Pakistan, cricket has long been the number-one sport.

What these sources typically omit is who those refugees bringing home their love for this distinctive sport were. The answer is not hard to deduce, as it is highly unlikely that Afghan refugees toiling from dawn to dusk in Pakistani markets or workshops just to feed their families could have developed a passion for cricket. Most of the refugees falling into this demographic lacked both the energy and the time for a game that can take nearly an entire day to play. By contrast students from religious schools — madrasas — whose education and living expenses in Pakistan were funded by Islamic charities or the governments of Muslim countries, had ample opportunity to learn the game.

When these people returned home, they were called “Talibs,” meaning “students,” in recognition of their time spent in madrasas, and it was the Talibs who brought cricket with them from Pakistan. However, the returnees soon clashed with the local Talibs, who disapproved of all sports — and of secular entertainment in general.

The “Pakistanis” ultimately prevailed. When the Taliban came to power in 2000, they initially banned all sports in Afghanistan, but they quickly made an exception for cricket. Today, after the Taliban's return to power, cricket (albeit only for men) remains the only sport permitted in the country.

Taliban cricket is not just a historical oddity; it vividly illustrates the deep connections between Pakistani and Afghan militants. It is no exaggeration to say that without Pakistan, there would be no Afghan cricket — and no Taliban either. After all, Afghan refugees in Quetta’s madrasas were taught much more than how to hold a bat and catch a ball.

The Origins of the Taliban

By the time of the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghanistan was already a source of constant concern for Pakistan. Warlords controlling the border regions operated independently, looting truck caravans carrying goods for Pakistani merchants, while local tribes and clans rejected the legitimacy of the border altogether. These tribes, predominantly Pashtun, were a particular irritation to Islamabad.

Pashtuns make up less than 20% of Pakistan’s population, but almost all of them live in the north, near the country’s border with Afghanistan. Since Pakistan's founding in the late 1940s, its central authorities have feared Pashtun separatism, which at times called for annexing border areas to Afghanistan or creating an independent “Pashtunistan.” These fears were not unfounded — Pakistan inherited not only cricket from the British, but also a border with Afghanistan that splits Pashtun lands in two.

During World War II, long before London began dismantling its Asian empire, Afghans demanded a revision of the border, claiming significant territories that, after the 1947 partition of British India, ultimately became part of Pakistan. Kabul has yet to formally recognize this border, leading to tensions with Islamabad.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing decade-long conflict only exacerbated the risks for both the Pakistani government and its business interests. Put simply, the growing instability in Afghanistan prompted Pakistani businesses, and later its authorities, to support a military-political force that could operate in their interests. That force eventually became the Taliban.

The idea was to steer active Pashtun youth — who were fleeing into Pakistan to escape the war— away from nationalism by focusing on religion. This approach was not unique. At around the same time, Israel was not obstructing the operations of the Islamic schools and charities that later evolved into Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as the authorities in Jerusalem hoped that Arab youth pursuing religious education would refrain from joining the then-secular Palestinian independence movement.

Afghans began enrolling en masse in Pakistani madrasas, where religious education was combined with military training for the Taliban. Islamabad was nurturing future allies in these border madrasas — people who could be trusted with securing the country’s northern regions, safeguarding trade routes, and protecting business interests. Additionally, these areas under Taliban control were used to establish training camps for militants needed in other regions, particularly in the contested territory of Kashmir on Pakistan’s border with India.

Pakistan's hidden support

After the Soviet withdrawal, when the Taliban got involved in the fight for control over Afghanistan, the group did not lack support from Pakistan. The authoritative military journal Jane's Defence Weekly reported that in the mid-1990s, Islamabad essentially rescued significant Taliban forces from defeat by sending a batch of four-wheel-drive pickups across the border. Thanks to these vehicles, the Taliban not only escaped a nearly inevitable encirclement, but also launched a counterattack.

A report presented to the British Parliament in the spring of 1997 on the situation in Afghanistan stated that hundreds of Pakistani citizens, including former military personnel, might be fighting alongside the Taliban. The report’s authors took it as a given that Islamabad's involvement in its neighboring country extended beyond logistical support or assistance in planning operations. In other words, the experts tasked with informing British MPs all but directly identified Pakistan as the main sponsor and ally of the Taliban.

A few months later, another report on the situation in Afghanistan was presented to the UN Security Council. Among other things, it stated that the Taliban was receiving entire convoys of weapons, fuel, and ammunition from abroad and that a foreign military camp was operating in the territory under its control. However, the report did not specify which border the supplies were crossing or which foreigners were managing the camp near Kabul.

At that time, the Taliban controlled Afghan borders with three neighboring countries: Turkmenistan, Iran, and Pakistan. The Turkmen regime of Saparmurat Niyazov saw Islamic movements as dangerous competitors and sought to exert total control over its citizens’ religious life, so it was unlikely to help foreign Islamists. Shia Iran had its own reasons to oppose the Taliban and deny them assistance — the Taliban deliberately persecuted Afghan Shia Muslims, considering them false Muslims and apostates. Therefore, it was Pakistan, traditionally close to Afghan insurgents, that emerged as the most likely partner for the Taliban in organizing the supply and training of fighters.

After the September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent American invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan found itself in a delicate position. Islamabad, one of Washington’s main partners in the region, denied having close ties with the Taliban. In essence, Pakistan’s official allies were waging an open war against its unofficial partners, and the authorities in Islamabad had to seriously consider which side to support.

After September 11, the Pakistani authorities officially backed the U.S.-led coalition. The lion's share of the supplies necessary for American-led military operations passed through Pakistan (the rest came by air through NATO logistics centers in Kyrgyzstan and Russia's Ulyanovsk). However, the sympathies of both the government and ordinary Pakistanis were largely with the Afghan Taliban. Immediately after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, then-Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan stated that the Afghans had “broken the chains of slavery.”

The new generation of Taliban against Pakistan

What the Pakistanis failed to consider was that the Taliban of the 2020s was vastly different from the group of students who had come through the border madrassas in the 1980s — the new generation has no fond memories of Pakistan. Most of them either had never been there or had entered through clandestine routes, risking arrest by Islamabad’s intelligence services. In general, they had nothing good to say about their neighbor.

In fact, there was much they disliked, considering Pakistan’s role in the collapse of the first Taliban government in the 2000s. The cooperation between Pakistani authorities and the Western coalition alienated local Pashtuns from official Pakistan. In 2007, several of their armed groups united to form the Pakistani Taliban, whose goal was to establish an independent Islamic emirate — if not across all of Pakistan, then at least within the ethnic Pashtun territories.

Over time, the Taliban became what their Pakistani sponsors had feared most: an actual proponent of Pashtun ethnonationalism. In multi-ethnic Afghanistan, after the Taliban came to power, almost all bureaucratic positions, even in regions with predominantly Tajik or Hazara populations, were filled by Pashtuns.

Once they had consolidated power and largely suppressed internal opposition, the Taliban turned their attention back to the unresolved territorial dispute with Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan had carried out strikes against fighters of the Pakistani Taliban and similar groups hiding on Afghan territory only increased the Taliban’s motivation.

In the fall of 2024, when the Taliban began building fortifications near the Pakistani border and moving armed units there, Islamabad concluded that their neighbors were preparing for war. The Taliban clearly cannot match the Pakistani army in direct combat — not even when supplemented with discarded Western equipment — and the border clashes that took place at the very end of last year and the beginning of this year clearly demonstrated where the advantage lies: the Pakistanis pushed back the Taliban’s forward units and burned their fortifications.

However, the Taliban’s mastery of guerrilla (or terrorist) tactics — along with the active support of militants from the local Pashtun population and the relative inaccessibility of the regions the Afghans claim — still threaten to turn this territorial dispute into a protracted Pakistan-Afghanistan war, albeit one of relatively low intensity.

Second front for Pakistan

In the Pakistani province of Balochistan, where clashes with the Taliban are currently taking place, the Islamabad government is also fighting another group of separatists. Since the 1970s, supporters of an independent state for the Baloch — a people living in the turbulent border region — have periodically made their presence known.

Several militant groups, the main one being the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) — which has been designated in the West as a terrorist organization — continue to wage a guerrilla war against Pakistan and Iran. The Baloch separatists are responsible for some of the most high-profile terrorist attacks in Pakistan in recent years, killing hundreds of Pakistanis, Iranians, and Chinese. The BLA views China, which is investing heavily in industrial projects in the Baloch regions of Pakistan and Iran, as an enemy. The separatists believe these projects strengthen the central government, which is why they target Chinese citizens.

Interestingly, the headquarters of the BLA was based in Afghanistan for many years, but after the Taliban came to power, the Baloch separatists left the country. This may be because the organization's ideology is based on secular, rather than religious, values. Or it could be because the historical region of Balochistan, claimed by the separatists, also includes parts of Afghan territory. Alternatively, it could be because the Taliban are direct competitors to the Baloch Liberation Army.

Both groups are seeking support from the residents of Pakistani Balochistan, and in recent years, the Pakistani Taliban has intensified its recruitment of Baloch people. There is no outright war between the Taliban and the supporters of Balochistan's independence, but there is also no alliance between them — this despite the fact that they are fighting not one, but two common enemies.

In addition to their respective struggles against the government in Islamabad, both groups are also fighting against the local branch of ISIS, known as Wilayat Khorasan or ISIS-K. This terrorist group operates in various regions — for example, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the March 2024 attack on Moscow's Crocus City Hall — but its core areas of operation are Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In the run-up to America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, ISIS was much more active in fighting the Taliban than the central government or Western forces were. The Taliban and ISIS occasionally engaged in rapprochement, which led some observers to question the reality of their conflict. However, these alliances were never strong or lasting. After returning to power, the Taliban began efforts to eliminate ISIS-K.

Official representatives of the Taliban assert that many of their opponents fled to Pakistan, where they established bases and training camps. They even directly accuse the Pakistani government of supporting terrorists. Naturally, this does not endear the Taliban to their neighboring state, which once literally nurtured them.

The Baloch go even further, accusing Islamabad of cooperating with ISIS. According to opposition representatives, the central authorities are literally aiding “Wilayat Khorasan” by helping jihadists establish themselves in Balochistan in order to turn it into their stronghold. These accusations are very serious, although unsubstantiated and, in the opinion of experts, not very convincing.

In the border region with Afghanistan, where at least twenty terrorist groups are active, there is little need for the patronage of distant central authorities to establish a training camp or recruitment center. Local tribal chieftains and feudal lords, who control nearly all of the region's economy and politics, are more than capable of organizing such operations on their own.

For these feudal lords, war is not just a familiar reality — it is an incredibly lucrative one. As long as the conflict persists, there will be a steady demand for weapons, ammunition, and fuel. The porous, largely uncontrollable border provides ample opportunities for smuggling all sorts of contraband, including people and drugs. And given that neither the Taliban — nor the Baloch separatists, nor ISIS — show any signs of stopping, the good times for these feudal lords are unlikely to end anytime soon.