Weekly Russia-Ukraine war summary: Russia faced with growing vehicle shortage, AFU withdraws from Velyka Novosilka, lull in Kursk Region

In this week's summary:

• Relative calm remains in Russia's Kursk Region as North Korean troops have been withdrawn from the front line.
• The Russian military is persistently trying to gain a foothold on a section of the highway running towards Mezhova west of Pokrovsk.
• In the vicinity of Kurakhove, the Russian Armed Forces are both squeezing out and outflanking the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) grouping.
• Ukrainian forces have abandoned Velyka Novosilka and are seeking to build a new defensive line north of it.
• The AFU has no stable control over any areas within Toretsk, with the fighting shifting to the outskirts of the city.
• UAV raids on Russian territory targeted the Druzhba oil pipeline and the oil pipeline to the port of Ust-Luga.
• Faced with a growing shortage of armored vehicles, the Russian Armed Forces are increasingly using civilian vehicles in combat.
• Israel has supplied 90 anti-aircraft missiles for Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine, and the possible future transfer of decommissioned Patriot systems is not ruled out.

Situation at the front

Russia's Kursk Region enjoyed a period of relative calm this past week. Ukraine's 82nd Separate Air Assault Brigade reported repulsing an assault by Russia's 155th Separate Marine Brigade, which is infamous for shooting Ukrainian prisoners of war. The Russian forces carried out strikes on populated areas occupied by the enemy. Russian television proudly presented a story from the “liberated” Nikolayevo-Daryino, which turned out to have been filmed in the village of Olgovka 20 kilometers to the north, from where AFU units withdrew back in October 2024.

The author of the Ofitser ✙ Telegram channel, a Ukrainian military officer, writes that neither side is conducting offensive actions on a large scale. He also notes Ukraine’s active use of FPV (first-person view) drones and munitions drops against Russian infantry. Meanwhile, the New York Times confirmed reports that North Korean troops' have withdrawn from the front line after sustaining major losses.

In the Pokrovsk sector, the Russian forces are unable to fully consolidate their hold on the Udachne-Kotlyne line on the highway running towards Mezhova west of Pokrovsk, which they had reached as early as Jan. 13, 2025. According to the latest available DeepState estimates, the Russian Armed Forces are advancing in Kotlyne, while the AFU is pushing them back in Udachne.

According to Ukrainian serviceman Oleksandr Solonko, the situation in the west of the Pokrovsk sector could be described as a tug-of-war scenario; however, the Russian command is still capable of staging vehicle-powered assaults on the highway from Myrnohrad to Kostiantynivka in the east, relying on the logistics hub in the captured Ocheretyne.

In the vicinity of Kurakhove, the Russian Armed Forces seek to both encircle AFU units in the Kurakhove pocket southwest of the abandoned Kurakhove and squeeze the Ukrainian troops out of the pocket. According to Russian self-styled “war correspondent” Yuri Kotenok, the Russian troops are already “closing the pocket” around the AFU grouping. However, the author of the Ukrainian channel Ofitser ✙ counters that the “neck” of the hypothetical pocket is in fact much wider than the 3 km suggested by some maps.

At the Vremivka Bulge, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported the capture of Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainian 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade claims that the brigade's soldiers “skillfully withdrew” from areas threatened with encirclement, which is probably accurate. Except for footage of individual bodies of Ukrainian soldiers and prisoners (1, 2, 3), the Russian sources' claims of massive losses and surrender of the Velyka Novosilka garrison have not been visually confirmed.

Since the garrison fell, the AFU has been working on a new defensive line along the Mokri Yaly River, which previously hampered the evacuation of the town's defenders but now serves as a natural water barrier.

In the Toretsk sector, the AFU has no stable control over any areas within the town of Toretsk, according to the DeepState map (1, 2, 3). The Russian Armed Forces also advanced in Nelipivka and, according to Russian estimates, in the pocket between Toretsk and Shcherbynivka. Fighting continues on the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk: Ukraine's 28th Separate Mechanized Brigade posted a video of a tank scoring a direct hit on a building sheltering Russian stormtroopers.

In the Lyman sector, Russian pro-war bloggers are outraged (1, 2, 3, 4) at the situation in Russia's 20th Combined Arms Army because of “false reports” of the capture of Novoehorivka and “meat-grinder assaults” aimed at pushing the front line to the previously reported coordinates. Ukraine's 3rd Separate Assault Brigade also denies Russia's capture of Novoehorivka, while Russian pro-war blogger Rybar attributes the confusion to the use of outdated Soviet maps.

Mutual strikes and sabotage

This past week, the AFU Air Force reported (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) intercepting 343 of 577 launched Shahed-type and other UAVs. Another 181 drones were “radar lost.” Two Kh-59/Kh-69 air-launched cruise missiles were also reported launched and downed on the night of Jan. 25.

In turn, Russia's MoD reported (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15) intercepting 247 Ukrainian fixed-wing UAVs over Russia and occupied Crimea, as well as destroying two amphibious drones in the Black Sea. Ukrainian strikes on the following targets were reported over the course of the week:

• The Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of Jan. 26, following an earlier attack on Jan. 24; the plant is known to have suspended its operations.
• A Russian Armed Forces command post in Korenevo, Kursk Region, and a loitering munitions depot in Orel Region (with reported destruction of 24 Shahed UAVs, 44 warheads, 30 Parodiya decoy UAVs, and 3.2 metric tons of fuel).
• The oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Region, the 23rd Main Missile and Artillery Directorate arsenal (no detonation occurred due to a lack of ammunition in storage), and the Andreapol oil pumping station in the Tver Region on the night of Jan. 29, resulting in a halt to oil exports from the port of Ust-Luga in the Leningrad Region.
• Ukrainian drones dropped FAB-250M-54 aerial bombs and 120-mm mines on the Novozybkov oil pumping station of the Druzhba oil pipeline in the Bryansk Region on the night of Jan. 30.
• The Volgograd Oil Refinery on the night of Jan. 31
• The command center of Russia's Kursk grouping in Rylsk, Kursk Region.

Losses

OSINT researcher Cyrus studied statistics on Russia's losses of armored vehicles using information from Oryx and Andrew Perpetua. Both sources indicate a decrease in armored vehicle losses. However, since overall losses remain high, this may not indicate an improving situation for the Russian Armed Forces, but a growing shortage of armored vehicles.

The Insider analyzed the situation with the warring sides' vehicle stocks and the prospects of their depletion for further combat operations. As for the Russian Armed Forces, their stocks of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery systems at storage bases have been depleted by about half, and the vast majority of the remaining vehicles are in unsuitable condition and could only be stripped for parts. With the manufacturing of new armored vehicles limited to several hundred units a year, Russia cannot even cover its losses on individual parts of the front like the Pokrovsk sector. Military analysts predict a complete depletion of Russian armored vehicle stocks or a sharp change in tactics with a decrease in the intensity of offensive actions within the next eighteen months. The Russian Armed Forces are already adapting. Instead of using armored vehicles in “meat-grinder assaults,” they are increasingly turning to a variety of non-armored vehicles including scooters, motorcycles, ATVs, and civilian cars.

The AFU has to make do with Western supplies of heavy armored vehicles, some of which appear hopelessly outdated, while the production of new equipment in NATO countries is lower even than the modest Russian figures. Judging by the structure of losses in Russia's Kursk Region, Ukrainian troops are resorting to the use of relatively light vehicles for offensive actions. Meanwhile, the AFU generally loses fewer vehicles than the Russian Armed Forces: according to various monitoring resources, the ratio of confirmed vehicle losses is approximately three times higher on the Russian side.

Weapons and military vehicles

This past week, the following military aid packages for Ukraine were made public:

• Israel has transferred 90 surface-to-air missiles for Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine with U.S. mediation. The Insider's security and defense columnist Colby Badhwar believes Ukraine is also set to receive one of Israel's decommissioned Patriot batteries, which is undergoing maintenance in the U.S.
• Sweden has announced its largest military aid package to Ukraine, worth$1.2 billion, which will include supplies of amphibious assault boats, ATGMs, and RPGs, as well as funding for the production of artillery, UAVs, and missiles, along with contracts with the Ukrainian military-industrial complex.
• Germany's budget committee has requested that Finance Minister Jörg Kukis approve an additional €3 billion in military aid to Ukraine.
• Polish company MISTA has modernized 150 BTR-70 armored personnel carriers, most likely in the interests of Ukraine.
• Lithuania transferred a batch of man-portable air defense systems to Ukraine, without reporting the type or quantity of systems.
• Finland has allocated its 27th military aid package to Ukraine, this one worth €200 million to Ukraine; as usual, it did so without disclosing its contents.

Meanwhile, due to the high losses of armored vehicles, Russian forces have begun to use tractors more frequently on the frontline territory. They also started to install seats on the roofs of vehicles for fighters armed with shotguns to shoot at drones (1, 2), and have begun using tires to protect gun barrels from Ukrainian FPV drones. Russian pro-war Telegram channels have also shown off a turret of six assault rifles and a searchlight mounted on a Ural motorcycle to hunt Ukrainian Baba Yaga drones. Meanwhile, Russian VT-40 FPV drones continue to pose a serious threat to operators due to the risk of spontaneous warhead activation (1, 2).

In the field of makeshift armor and upgrades, Russian frontline craftsmen have demonstrated the following achievements:

• An infantry fighting vehicle with a “royal barbecue grill” featuring unbraided metal cables as a makeshift defense against shaped charge ammunition.
• A “royal barbecue grill” with New Year's graffiti in the form of a Christmas tree and a Santa Claus hat.
• An “armored shed” nicknamed ‘Gorynych’ after the Russian fairy-tale dragon was used for towing a trophy M113 APC.
• A heavy APC based on the T-72B3 with a troop compartment instead of a turret and additional armor made of bricks and logs.